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1 Introduction: Iran and the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
The period between 1978 and 1988 remains the most important decade for the formation of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the important events that took place within this timeframe 
continue to exert an immeasurable impact on the outlook of the modern Iranian state. The ten 
years between the beginning of the 1978-79 Revolution and the end of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
War witnessed the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to become one of 
the most powerful institutions within the emerging post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure, 
a position the IRGC was to retain over the next twenty years following the War’s end. This 
paper aims to analyse how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps developed from a hastily 
gathered and ill-trained militia in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution to become Iran’s 
largest armed force, providing both external and internal security, while at the same time 
penetrating Iranian society by engaging in politics, industry, education and other civilian 
spheres of activity. I will argue that the key to understanding the IRGC’s rise in power and 
influence is to be found in the eight year long Iran-Iraq War, and building on Charles Tilly’s 
theoretical framework of “war-making and state-making” I will show how the effects of the 
War played a determining role in shaping the outcome of the Iranian Revolution, as well as 
the formation of the governmental structures and institutions that emerged within the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
 
In the turmoil that followed the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini on 5 May 1979 
issued a decree for the creation of the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, literally 
meaning the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, more commonly known as the 
Revolutionary Guard (or often simply referred to as the “Sepah” or the “Pasdaran”).1
                                                 
1 Wehrey, Frederic, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi & S. R. 
Bohandy (2009): The Rise of the Pasdaran. Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps (2009) p.20. 
 The 
IRGC was to play a determining role in helping the Khomeinists prevail in the internal 
struggle to secure their grip over the post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure. However from 
its inception the Revolutionary Guard was but one of many revolutionary organisations 
competing for influence over Iranian society, and it was not a given that the IRGC would 
become such an important institution within the emerging Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iraqi 
invasion in September 1980 profoundly changed the role and responsibilities of the Islamic 
2 
 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, developing from a makeshift revolutionary militia focused on the 
domestic environment into a well-organised, full-fledged army charged with taking the lead in 
the Iranian war effort. Volunteers flocked to the IRGC as popular revolutionary fervour was 
channelled into the War against Iraq, and with the substantial increases in manpower the 
Revolutionary Guard came to outgrow the regular Iranian Army and become Iran’s principal 
institution of organised violence. The War at the same time altered the internal Iranian power 
balance and provided a convenient pretext for the Khomeinist regime to deal with political 
challengers at home, the IRGC utilising its newfound power to undermine and defeat its 
internal rivals. The Revolutionary Guard’s increased influence also warranted its infiltration 
into the civilian spheres of the Islamic Republic, becoming an important political actor in its 
own right, engaging in the distribution of goods and benefits to its main constituents, and 
developing a substantial weapons industry to name but a few of the IRGC’s extensive 
activities. This paper aims to shed light on these above mentioned processes to explain exactly 
how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps came to occupy such an important role within the 
post-revolutionary Iranian state, focusing on the IRGC’s development from its early 
beginnings in the Iranian Revolution to become a large and powerful organisation wielding 
considerable influence over multiple sectors of the Iranian state at the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War. 
 
Since the end of the eight year struggle between Iran and Iraq, the IRGC has been established 
as one of Iran’s main power-centres, and arguably today the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps seems stronger than ever. To show but a few examples of the IRGC’s importance in 
present-day Iran, the current Iranian president, Mahmud Ahmedinejad, and about fifty percent 
of his ministers have a background from the IRGC, and the Revolutionary Guards played a 
pivotal role in quieting the huge protests after Ahmedinejad’s re-election as president in 2009. 
The much debated Iranian nuclear research centres and power-plants are built on the premises 
of the Revolutionary Guards who play a key role in their operation and activities. In addition 
IRGC-members exercise a lot of influence over Iranian society through personal networks, 
and enjoy benefits and privileges like tax exemptions, first call on scarce goods and have 
control over a large shadow economy, engaging in black-market profiteering. The IRGC’s 
reach extends to virtually every sector of the Iranian market, from laser eye surgery and 
automobile manufacturing to engineering, construction and real estate, prompting Iranian 
dissident Mohsen Sazegara, one of the IRGC’s early founders, to assert that the Revolutionary 
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Guard today constitutes something like a “Communist party, the KGB, a business complex, 
and the mafia” all in one organisation.2
 
 It is my aim in this paper to show that the precursors 
to the IRGC’s extensive penetration of the Iranian state can be found in developments that 
took place during the Iran-Iraq War, and that the War was the major factor conditioning the 
rise and shape of the IRGC’s substantial organisation. In order to fully understand how the 
IRGC came to occupy such a prominent position in Iranian society and political life, it is 
essential to study its early origins and history, starting with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps’ creation in the course of the Iranian Revolution. I will argue that the Iran-Iraq War that 
followed shortly after and was a direct consequence of the Revolution, in many ways was the 
defining moment of the IRGC, which still derives much of its legitimacy from its performance 
in the War. Thus even though this paper is mainly concerned with analysing and explaining 
historical events from the Islamic Republic’s first decade, it is also highly relevant for 
understanding the situation in Iran today. Analysing the rise of the IRGC during the ten year 
period between 1978 and 1988, I will make the overall argument that the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps was born by Revolution, and raised by War. 
2 How Wars shape States: Exploring theories of war, state-building, 
revolutions and armies 
How exactly does warfare influence the shaping of governmental institutions within a state? 
Or, to be more specific regarding the case at hand, in what ways did the Iran-Iraq War 
contribute to the rise of the Revolutionary Guard to become one of the most powerful new 
institutions within the post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure? As should be clear from the 
introduction above, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps grew into becoming a very 
multifaceted and quite complicated organisation in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. The 
difficulty of accurately defining the IRGC, or “fitting” it into a certain typology or broader 
category that captures the many dimensions of this complex institution, makes it equally hard 
to find an overarching theoretical framework to help analyse the Revolutionary Guard’s rise 
in power and influence within the post-revolutionary Iranian state. Nevertheless there are 
some suggestive theories that might aid us along the way in this endeavour by drawing focus 
to one or a few aspects of the IRGC at a time. Charles Tilly’s theory of “war-making and 
                                                 
2 Mohsen Sazegara, quoted in Wehrey et al. (2009) p.55, 2. 
4 
 
state-making” constitutes a valuable framework in this regard, highlighting how the 
preparation for and prosecution of warfare leads to the development of stronger and more 
powerful governmental organisations within a state. Tilly’s theory of how war acts as a 
catalyst conditioning and shaping the rise of a state’s internal institutions is however not 
without its fair share of critiques, and I will discuss the most commonly voiced of these in 
order to justify the appliance of Tilly’s framework as a tool to better understand the 
development of the IRGC in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. Before turning to Tilly’s 
framework however, it is also important to emphasise that the rise of the Revolutionary Guard 
cannot be understood without reference to the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, and drawing on 
insights from studies by Theda Skocpol and Jonathan R. Adelman is very helpful in 
understanding the important links between revolutions, armies and war. Taken together, these 
theories go a long way in offering a guiding framework to help explain the development of 
the IRGC from a revolutionary militia into a full-fledged army, engaging in intense 
international warfare and gaining increasingly more influence within the new post-
revolutionary Iranian state-structure. 
 
2.1 Definitions, choice of theory and scope of analysis 
Before turning to the theoretical frameworks, some preliminary definitions and clarifications 
are in order. First of all, the principal aim of this study, to investigate the rise of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq War, means that it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyse the development of the Iranian state as a whole. To more accurately narrow 
down the focus of my analysis, it can be useful to begin with a widely accepted definition of 
the very term “state” itself, provided by the standards of international law, where a state, to be 
recognised as such, needs to fulfil four basic requirements; a clearly defined territory, a 
permanent population, a government wielding authority over the population in the territory, 
and independence in relations with other states.3
                                                 
3 Ruud, Morten & Geir Ulfstein (2002): Innføring i Folkerett [Introduction to International Law] p.96-100. 
 Out of these four criteria of statehood, this 
paper is solely focused on the one requirement of government, and not with the historical 
development of the Iranian state in its entirety to encompass all of these criteria. In any case, 
regarding Iran, the requirements of territory, population and independence remained more or 
less unaltered by the major events that are the subject of this paper, namely the 1978-79 
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Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.4 More to the point, this paper is concerned with 
analysing how these two momentous events influenced and shaped the last criteria of 
statehood; the emergence of new governmental structures in post-revolutionary Iran, and the 
role of the IRGC in this process. Central to my analysis will therefore be the concept of state-
building, which will be used to denote the larger processes of establishing and building state 
institutions. It should be noted from the very outset that the concept of state-building in this 
paper will be differentiated from the often otherwise related term state-making, which will be 
used in strict accordance with Tilly’s theoretical framework, where it simply is defined as 
state-controlled violence aimed at eliminating or neutralizing internal rivals.5
 
 State-making is 
thus to be understood as but one of Tilly’s four “state-activities”, together with war-making, 
protection and extraction (as will be further discussed below), which together influence and 
shape the wider process of state-building. 
Studying the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps within a theory of how war 
effects state-building certainly warrants some further justification. Turning to Tilly’s 
framework of war and state-making, the potential effect of warfare on all of the four above 
mentioned criteria of statehood should be recognised (incorporating/losing territory and 
population, gaining/subverting independence), but again, in accordance with this paper, the 
bulk of Tilly’s theory is focused on the shaping of governmental institutions. The important 
question thus remains as to which degree the IRGC can be said to represent the Iranian 
government as such, or whether it rather represents one political faction among others within 
the state. The latter might seem a good description of the IRGC today, especially in light of 
the organisation’s later development after the end of the War and the death of its creator and 
main political ally Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. With the death of Khomeini the Islamic 
Republic lost its uniting father figure and was left more open to political factionalism. 
However, as will be shown in this paper, the Revolutionary Guard’s early development was 
closely tied to the rise of the Khomeinist regime to dominate the Iranian state, and with the 
IRGC performing many important state functions in this process, as well as later, it is 
                                                 
4 Formally Iran’s independence was acknowledged when the last Allied troops left the country following the end 
of World War II, although the US continued to enjoy considerable influence through their close relationship with 
the Shah. As regards territory and population, Iranians often draw their roots way back historically to the empire 
of Cyrus the Great, approximately year 559 BC, which although a truth with moderations clearly testifies to the 
belief in a defined homeland and people, although Iran’s borders today are a product of relatively modern times. 
5 Tilly, Charles (1985):”War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” p.169-187 in Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds.): Bringing the State Back In p.181. 
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therefore safe to say that the IRGC played an important role in post-revolutionary Iranian 
state-building as part of the emerging governmental structure. Charles Tilly’s framework of 
war and state-making thus constitutes a valuable tool for my analysis of how the Iran-Iraq 
War contributed to the rise of the IRGC to become one of the most dominating institutions 
within the new Iranian state after 1979. 
 
Utilising insights from Tilly’s framework of how warfare conditions state-building to analyse 
the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq War certainly also has 
its limitations. First of all, it is important to keep in mind that the Iran-Iraq War had major 
repercussions not only for the Revolutionary Guard, but also for other governmental 
institutions and Iranian society as a whole, not to mention the War’s regional and international 
dimensions, which I will not devote much attention in this paper.6 The complex organisation 
of the Iranian state, consisting of a wide and intricate network of different institutions with 
varying responsibilities and areas of influence, cannot possibly be explained by reference to 
the IRGC alone, and as such this paper is merely concerned with but one dimension of the 
Iranian state-building experience that took place during the Iran-Iraq War. Second, it is also 
important to acknowledge that although war is a major factor in shaping governmental 
institutions, it is by no means the sole source of state-building, and no such claim is made 
either by Tilly or in this paper. It is important to recognise that other factors, like geopolitical 
and socio-economic contexts, also play vital parts in any state-building process.7 Nevertheless 
the development of the IRGC into such a powerful and influential organisation, which 
importance in Iranian society arguably has grown even greater since the war-years, clearly 
makes this one of the most enduring impacts that the War left on the Iranian state-structure, 
making the rise of the Revolutionary Guards an important area of study deserving of further 
attention. As Rasler & Thompson assert on a general level, different types of wars have 
varying impacts on different societies.8
                                                 
6 Consult the accompanied literature-list for texts offering a wider coverage of these aspects of the Iran-Iraq War. 
 To this we might add that the timing of a war is also 
very important, and to fully understand the far-reaching effects of the Iran-Iraq War on the 
development of the IRGC it is unavoidable to begin with analysing the watershed event of the 
1978-79 Iranian Revolution. 
7 Rasler, Karen A. & William R. Thompson (1989): War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers 
p.210-11. 
8 Rasler & Thompson (1989) p.2-5. 
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2.2 Revolution, Armies and War 
Studying the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War 
would of course make little sense without reference to the before-happening Iranian 
Revolution of 1978-79. The Revolution and the War were intimately bound together, as I will 
go into more specific detail about later, in section 3.5 (From Revolution to War). A very 
important point that however should be stressed right away is that it was the Revolution, in 
sweeping away the established regime of Mohammed Reza Shah, which brought with it the 
requirements of renewed state-building in Iran, understood as the creation of new 
governmental institutions capable of exerting influence and power over the Iranian population 
and territory. The Shah’s state was viewed as an instrument of oppression by the Iranian 
revolutionaries, and therefore many of the distrusted institutions created by the Shah were 
dismantled, re-organised or temporarily closed down in the course of the Revolution. Those 
organisations allowed to persist, like the regular Iranian Army, were subject to purges, had 
their influence severely circumscribed and were kept under strict surveillance. As a result, 
there were few existing organisations which the revolutionary authorities were willing to trust 
faced with such a serious challenge as represented by the Iraqi invasion. This might help 
explain why the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps became such an important institution 
within the post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure, as it constituted one of few institutions 
capable of both supplying the needed manpower, and deemed trustworthy enough by the 
Khomeinist regime, to perform many vital functions as the Iranian society became engulfed in 
the War. The Revolution and the War must therefore be seen in conjunction to fully explain 
how the IRGC expanded its influence over different spheres of the Iranian state. 
 
It is hardly surprising that revolutions, given their usually violent nature, regularly are 
followed by even more violence, often in the form of international warfare. Studying the 
English, French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, Adelman concludes that in general 
revolutions tend to promote wars and intervention by external powers.9
                                                 
9 Adelman, Jonathan R. (1985): Revolution, Armies and War – A Political History p.4. 
 Skocpol, comparing 
these “classic” older revolutions with newer ones such as in Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, notes 
the same pattern, commenting that revolutions seem to make wars more likely because 
domestic conflicts often spill over to involve foreign partners and because revolutions create 
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perceived threats and opportunities for other, often neighbouring, states.10 Skocpol further 
asserts that the way in which revolutionary leaders mobilise mass popular support in the 
course of the struggle for state power in turn increases the potential to build strong new state 
institutions.11 Furthermore, the task at which the revolutionised regimes in the modern world 
seemingly have performed the best is in the mobilisation of citizen support for protracted 
international warfare, excelling at motivating the population for making supreme sacrifices in 
war.12 Revolutions thus often lead to a markedly raised capacity for a nation to wage humanly 
costly wars, a conclusion also derived at by Adelman, and an assessment that seems to very 
well describe developments in the case of Iran.13 Skocpol attributes this outcome to 
geopolitical circumstances and the political relationship established between the state-building 
leadership and the rebellious lower classes in the early days of the revolution. Moreover, the 
revolutionary enthusiasm derived from defeating internal enemies can easily be converted into 
the task of mass military mobilisation against external threats, with guerrilla armies, urban 
militias and committees of surveillance having served as splendid agencies of military 
recruitment from the French to the Iranian Revolution.14
 
 Going from revolution to war, it is 
only natural that the new revolutionary armies come to play a very important part in post-
revolutionary state-building, and in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran this role was filled 
by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
As already mentioned, and as I will return to later, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
certainly developed to become much more than an ordinary conventional army. Nevertheless 
the IRGC’s basic structure is clearly based on that of a military institution, and as Adelman 
notes, without the creation of a strong and capable revolutionary army, any revolution has a 
poor chance of success. Many important tasks usually befall the new army in a revolutionary 
setting, not only including defending the revolution and its accomplishments from domestic 
counterrevolutionaries and external enemies, but often also playing a major role in the 
reconstruction and rebuilding of society, given the inherit disintegration of the old state-order 
implied by the revolution itself.15
                                                 
10 Skocpol, Theda (1988):”Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization” p.147-168 in World Politics Vol. 
40, No. 2 (Jan) p.150-1. 
 This makes the revolutionary army paramount in the 
11 Skocpol (1988) p.167-8. 
12 Skocpol (1988) p.149-50. 
13 Skocpol (1988) p.152, further elaborated in Adelman (1985) ch.3-11. 
14 Skocpol (1988) p.149-152. 
15 Adelman (1985) p.4-5. 
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establishment and consolidation of a new state-structure. According to Adelman, the 
institution of the military usually goes through four steps in the course of a revolution: firstly, 
before the revolution takes place, the old army is closely tied up with the old order and largely 
viewed as inefficient, corrupt and expensive by the population. In the second phase, a new 
army rises, after or before the actual seizure of power, to defend the gains of the revolution. In 
the third phase the new consolidated revolutionary army, backed by a new centralized and 
capable government, sweeps aside internal domestic foes (what Tilly would label state-
making) and often wins major victories against strong external enemies (war-making in 
Tilly’s terminology, as I will return to below). This is then followed by a fourth phase in 
which there is a tendency towards decline in revolutionary fervour both within the new army 
and the new government, but as this paper is mainly concerned with analysing the rise of the 
Revolutionary Guards, and noting that the IRGC in any case still remains quite dedicated to 
its revolutionary mission and ideals, this last phase is of little relevance to us here.16
 
 However 
the first three steps seem to accurately describe the development of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps as a military organisation, as will be clearly demonstrated in the remainder of 
this paper. 
Summing up Skocpol and Adelman’s findings, revolutions often lead to mass mobilisation of 
a new strong revolutionary army, which is charged with many important tasks in the post-
revolutionary setting. At the same time revolutions tend to markedly increase the chance of 
interstate warfare due to perceived threats or opportunities by other states, and the possibility 
of domestic conflicts spilling over to include foreign sponsors. As will be shown, these 
premises very much seem to hold true in the case of Iran, where the Revolution lead to the 
creation of the IRGC and was followed by the Iran-Iraq War. Turning to Tilly’s framework 
then becomes a natural next step in order to explore how war-making in turn influences the 
course of state-building. Given the fact that revolutions usually bring with them the 
requirements of establishing new state institutions to replace the old ones, the effects of 
engaging in intense interstate warfare are likely to shape the formation of these institutions to 
an even larger degree in a society that is in the process of rebuilding itself from the impact of 
a revolution. 
 
                                                 
16 Adelman (1985) p.202-3. 
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2.3 Tilly’s theory of war-making and state-making 
Charles Tilly’s framework of war-making and state-making takes as its starting point the 
different uses of state-controlled violence which can be used and combined in varying ways to 
influence the process of state-building. Tilly asserts that, under the general heading of 
organised violence, the agents of states characteristically carry out four different activities: 
 
1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have 
clear and continuous priority as wielders of force 
2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories 
3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients 
4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state making, 
and protection.17
These four state-activities can each take a number of forms and overlap in varying degrees; 
for instance, extraction can range from outright plunder to bureaucratised taxation, and 
waging war on external enemies might entail eliminating or neutralising the enemies of one’s 
own clients. Yet all four are dependent on the state’s ability to monopolise the means of 
violence, and each of them, if carried out effectively, tends to reinforce the others. Thus, a 
state that successfully eradicates its internal rivals strengthens its ability to extract resources, 
to wage war, and to protect its chief supporters.
 
18
In an idealized sequence, a great lord made war so effectively as to become dominant in a substantial 
territory, but that war making led to increased extraction of the means of war – men, arms, food, 
lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or the money to buy them – from the population within that 
territory. The building up of war making capacity likewise increased the capacity to extract. The very 
activity of extraction, if successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great 
lord's local rivals; thus, it led to state making. As a by-product, it created organization in the form of tax 
collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequers, account keepers; thus it again led to state making. 
To a lesser extent, war making likewise led to state making through the expansion of military 
organization itself, as a standing army, war industries, supporting bureaucracies, and (rather later) 
schools grew up within the state apparatus. All of these structures checked potential rivals and 
opponents. In the course of making war, extracting resources, and building up the state apparatus, the 
managers of states formed alliances with specific social classes. The members of those classes loaned 
 Tilly envisions that, in an “idealized 
sequence” taking place over a longer period of time, war-making will initiate a process 
leading to the rise of a state-apparatus along the following lines: 
                                                 
17 Tilly (1985) p.181. 
18 Tilly (1985) p.181. 
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resources, provided technical services, or helped ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, all 
in return for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies.19
 
 
Tilly thus imagines the interaction between the four state-activities to function as shown in 
figure 1.1 below, in which war-making occupies the central role, being the only activity 
directly influencing all the other variables. 
 
   
War-Making  Extraction 
   
Protection  State-Making 
   
Figure 1.1. Tilly’s model of War-making and State-making 
Source: Tilly (1985) p.183. 
 
 
Rasler & Thompson’s study of war and state-making supports Tilly’s basic argument that war 
is one of the most significant and enduring sources of state-building.20 However Rasler & 
Thompson expand Tilly’s simple model to include far more details and mechanisms, ending 
up with a far more complicated structure. Some of Rasler & Thompson’s adjustments, like 
including numerous external factors that might influence or lead to the activity of war-
making, do not concern us here as this paper is concerned with exploring the connections 
between revolution, war and state-building, and not the causes of war in general.21 Other of 
Rasler &Thompson’s criticisms are of more interest, for example I agree that the relationship 
between Tilly’s four state-activities is likely more reciprocal than his rigid model allows for.22
                                                 
19 Tilly (1985) p.183. 
 
I especially believe this to be true in the case at hand, where the impact of going almost 
straight from revolution to war necessitated the prosecution of war-making, state-making, 
extraction and protection in parallel by the new revolutionary regime in Tehran, making the 
four activities influence each other much more in tandem and over a relatively much shorter 
20 Rasler & Thompson (1989) p.5. 
21 For Rasler &Thompson’s full and thorough review of Tilly’s model with criticisms and adjustments, see 
Rasler & Thompson (1989) p.10-26. 
22 Rasler & Thompson (1989) p.10-11. 
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period of time than allowed for in Tilly’s “idealized sequence”. Rasler & Thompson also 
question the feasibility of maintaining clear-cut boundaries between the activities of war-
making, meaning war on external enemies, and state-making, defined as “war” on internal 
enemies or rivals.23
 
 Often this distinction will be blurred in reality, and again Iran is a case in 
point where the Revolutionary Guards engaged in warfare against both external and internal 
rivals, classifying both as enemies of the new state or simply “the enemies of Islam”. 
However I will maintain the distinction between the “external” and the “internal” functions of 
the IRGC to structure my analysis, and instead highlight along the way how performance in 
either activity influenced and led to empowerment in other spheres within the emerging 
Iranian state-structure. 
2.4 Applying Tilly’s framework to the case of Iran 
It should be made clear from the start that the development of post-revolutionary institutions 
in Iran in many ways does not conform strictly to Tilly’s “idealized sequence” of state-
building. One obvious difference is that Tilly’s framework imagines as it starting point the 
total absence of any meaningful state-like formation, while in the case of Iran a modern state 
certainly existed before the advent of the 1978-79 Revolution. Iran’s revolutionaries were 
however very sceptical of the state they inherited, which was largely viewed as an instrument 
of the Shah’s oppression, and as mentioned the Revolution swept away many of the 
established institutions of the Shah’s regime. Moreover, driven by the conception that the 
state was ultimately a reactionary tool aimed at subduing the population, the post-
revolutionary regime adopted a strategy of creating multiple mutually independent institutions 
to counterbalance each other, aimed at preventing any one institution of becoming too 
powerful and dominating the others.24
                                                 
23 Rasler & Thompson (1989) p.11. 
 Although sceptical to the idea of the modern state, the 
revolutionary authorities nevertheless ended up creating new capable and powerful 
governmental institutions, especially as the political faction closest to Khomeini, supported by 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, grew to dominate the power-centres of the post-
revolutionary Iranian state in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. War therefore remained a major 
source of shaping state-building in Iran, even though the creation of the Islamic Republic did 
24 Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Kjetil Selvik (2008):”Destructive Competition: Factionalism and Rent-Seeking in Iran” p. 
2314–2324 in World Development Vol. 36, no. 11 p.2316, see also Katzman, Kenneth (1993): The Warriors of 
Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard p.30. 
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not take place in a total vacuum of “state-ness”, and Tilly’s framework of war-making and 
state-making should thus better be understood as a continuing process influencing not only the 
emergence, but also the further development of state-structures. 
 
A more profound and commonly voiced critique of Charles Tilly’s model of war-making and 
state-making concerns its applicability across different cases and time periods. Like most of 
the research conducted within the field of the emergence of the modern nation-state, Tilly’s 
framework is inherently derived from a study of the European state-building experience from 
roughly post-1500, making many scholars question its validity in relation to later processes of 
state-formation in a non-European context. Sørensen has pointed to the apparent absence of 
war-making and state-making in the Tillyan sense leading to successful state-building in the 
third world, where many states remain weak and underdeveloped in terms of effective 
institutions wielding authority over their respective territory and population. Sørensen 
attributes this outcome mainly to the prevailing conventions of the present international 
system, where strong norms against territorial expansion through aggressive warfare in effect 
give third world countries what he calls “a certified life insurance, deposited with the United 
Nations, which guarantees the absence of external mortal danger”.25 In other words, post-
colonial countries are guaranteed sovereign statehood as long as the international community 
continues to view existing borders as legal and legitimate, while attempts to change them by 
force are not. This decreases the power-holders’ long term considerations and incentives to 
build strong and durable state-structures, instead opting for seeking quick revenues, and 
facing no serious external threats, third world armies tend to face inwards and focus on the 
domestic realm.26 Unlike in Europe, where state-formation took place within a context of 
facing deadly external threats, Sørensen therefore argues that war-making constitutes a less 
important source of state-building in the contemporary third world and that the Eurocentric 
preoccupation with the constructive effects of war-making is in need of revision.27
 
 
Although Sørensen’s assessments certainly should be kept in mind, a conclusion more 
favourable to the validity of Tilly’s theory is found in a study of state-building in the third 
                                                 
25 Sørensen, Georg (2001):”War and State-Making: Why Doesn't it Work in the Third World?” p.341-354 in 
Security Dialogue Vol. 32 p.346. 
26 Sørensen (2001) p.346-7. 
27 Sørensen (2001) p.352. 
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world conducted by Cameron Thies. Using a sample of 83 post-colonial developing countries 
between 1975 and 2000, Thies finds that the presence of external rivals significantly increases 
a state’s ability to extract tax revenues from its population.28 The ability to extract taxes is 
seen as a measurement of the effectiveness of state institutions, in accordance with Tilly’s 
extraction, thus indicating a higher degree of state-building. The key independent variable in 
the study, external rivalry, is defined as the threat of external war, which, allowing for the 
inclusion of preparations for war, can be said to constitute a milder version of Tilly’s concept 
of war-making. Thies asserts that as rivalry is found to have a positive effect on state-
building, actual interstate warfare might to an even larger degree lead to the development of 
stronger state institutions in the third world.29
 
 In any case many of the post-colonial 
developing countries are still relatively young compared to the their European counterparts, 
and as they often have been created along the lines of the European model of statehood, 
Tilly’s insights might still be relevant although meeting with a mixed track-record when it 
comes to explaining state-building in the third world. 
Directing our focus closer to the geographical area under study in this paper, Schwarz draws 
attention to the remarkable absence of studies on the interplay between war-making and state-
formation when it comes to the Middle East.30 He also comments on the notable absence of 
the concept of rentierism as a factor conditioning state-building. Schwarz defines rents as 
state income from abroad derived by selling natural resources, especially oil and gas.31 This 
very much pertains to the case of Iran as one of the world’s major oil-exporting countries. 
Following Schwarz, the idea is that in a rentier-state oil-income, or income from any other 
natural resources, reduces the need for the state to extract resources from its society, thus 
reducing the need to develop effective state institutions, like tax-collecting agencies, for this 
purpose. Thus, according to Schwarz, rentierism sets off the Tillyan process that links war-
making to state-formation by offsetting the need to extract further resources from society, and 
regionally-specific contextual factors like these should be devoted more attention in the 
analysis of non-European state-building.32
                                                 
28 Thies, Cameron G. (2004):”State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial 
Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000” p.53-72 in International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, No. 1 
(Mar). 
 Although it is hard to disagree with Schwarz on 
29 Thies (2004) p.68-9. 
30 Schwarz, Rolf (2004): State Formation Processes in Rentier States: The Middle Eastern Case p.9. 
31 Schwarz (2004) p.13-14. 
32 Schwarz (2004) p.20-4. 
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this last point, I nevertheless justify treating the rise of the IRGC within Tilly’s theoretical 
framework of war-making and state-making for two reasons. First of all, as part of the riots 
that lead up to the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution oil workers went on strike, closing down many 
oil refineries and most of the Iranian oil fields.33 The victory of the Revolution, with its 
emphasis on ridding Iran of foreign influence, in turn led to a mass exodus of the foreign 
workforce which for decades had occupied a central role in the Iranian oil-industry as 
managers and technical experts, while the Iranian workers themselves had largely been 
confined to less paid lower-level jobs within the oil-industry. This left the new Iranian regime 
incapable of resuming oil-production at pre-revolutionary levels and resulted in a substantial 
drop in oil-revenues. This was then further compounded by the effects of the Iran-Iraq War, 
with a string of successful Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil-installations resulting in the crippling of 
the Iranian production-capability and infrastructure, while international trade embargos 
imposed on Iran at the same time increasingly lead to the shortage of essential equipment and 
spare parts.34
 
 Secondly, and relating to my first point, the War with Iraq proved to be so 
lengthy and costly that the Iranian regime had to extract as much resources as possible from 
its population, not being able to function simply as a rentier state, and thus allowing warfare 
to exert a considerable impact on the emerging Iranian state-structure. As should be clear 
from the above discussion however, Tilly’s theory of war and state-making by no means 
constitutes an undisputable, universally applicable framework for analysing every aspect of 
the state-building process. Nevertheless it seems to accurately capture some of the most 
important processes leading to the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the 
Iran-Iraq War, and as such functions well to help structure my analysis. 
2.5 Thesis-structure: From Revolution to War and the rise of the IRGC 
Utilising Tilly’s framework as a basis, I will first focus my analysis on the role of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps in war-making, that is to say the external war against Iraq, in 
chapter 4. This chapter will also include a discussion of how the IRGC’s role in the war effort 
could later be used to cultivate a large amount of legitimacy, derived from the Revolutionary 
Guard’s performance in the “sacred defence” of the Islamic Republic and the Revolution. In 
the following chapter I will then turn my analysis to the IRGC’s elimination and 
neutralisation of domestic rivals, what is labelled state-making following Tilly’s terminology. 
                                                 
33 Abrahamian, Ervand (1982): Iran Between Two Revolutions p.517-8. 
34 Chubin, Shahram & Charles Tripp (1988): Iran and Iraq at War p.134-7. 
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Here I will focus on the IRGC’s internal functions, showing how the Revolutionary Guard 
increasingly came to monopolise the means of violence and also took on an active political 
role within the Iranian state. The Tillyan concept of protection will then briefly be treated in 
chapter 6, showing how the members of the IRGC, also constituting the main supporters of 
the emerging Iranian regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, received special rights and privileges in 
return for ensuring that the rest of the population remained in compliance with the authorities. 
The Revolutionary Guard’s role in the extraction of resources will not be treated separately, 
but rather as this final of Tilly’s four state-activities is simply defined as “[a]cquiring the 
means of carrying out the first three activities”, it will be addressed implicitly throughout the 
paper.35
 
 Given the Revolutionary Guard’s extensive involvement in all four of Tilly’s state-
activities, it is no wonder the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps grew to become one of the 
most powerful institutions within the new Iranian state during the Iran-Iraq War. However the 
IRGC also developed to engage in activities that went beyond the simple employment of 
organised violence, dimensions that are equally important to fully understand and get a 
complete picture of the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
In addition to growing into Iran’s largest armed force in the course of the War, the IRGC also 
expanded its role into what we would typically characterise as non-military sectors, like 
industry, education and the economy. The way in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps developed from an inherently military organisation into these other fields of activity 
have by some researchers, like Wehrey et al. and Wiig, been compared to similar experiences 
in countries like Russia, China and Pakistan.36 Much like in Iran, these countries witnessed 
the rise of a strong army to defend a newly established regime, following communist 
revolutions in Russia and China and after gaining independence in the case of Pakistan. The 
role of the army in Pakistan perhaps constitutes the most similar example to that of the IRGC 
in Iran, as the Pakistani military substantially expanded its reach into the agricultural, 
manufacturing, construction and service sectors and established extensive networks linking 
the army to the different activities of the state.37
                                                 
35 Tilly (1985) p.181. 
 The Pakistani military also developed into a 
key player in domestic politics, again much comparable to the role of the IRGC in Iran. Of 
course the similarities between these cases should not in any way be overstated, and I will 
36 Wehrey et al. (2009) p.94-98, Wiig, Audun Kolstad (2007): Au service de l’Etat? La formation économique et 
politique des Pasdaran iraniens et la militarisation de la société p.13-18. 
37 Wehrey et al. (2009) p.95-6. 
17 
 
briefly return to some important differences between the IRGC and the Soviet and Chinese 
communist armies in chapter 5. However, although comparing the rise of the IRGC in Iran to 
other similar cases certainly could yield new important insights into the mechanisms that 
prompt military institutions to expand their influence over society, little research has been 
done within this area, and it will not be devoted much attention in this paper. 
 
Arguably the development of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps beyond the military 
sphere can in many ways be predicted within Tilly’s framework of war-making and state-
making. Tilly himself notes the seemingly extraordinary importance of strong military 
organisations in third world countries, asserting that: 
To a larger degree, states that have come into being recently […] have acquired their military 
organization from outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and 
ruled. To the extent that outside states continue to supply military goods and expertise in return for 
commodities, military alliance or both, the new states harbor powerful, unconstrained organisations that 
easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories.38
 
 
The role of the military thus becomes even more important in the state-building process of 
these newer, post-World War II states, and Tilly asserts that “the managers of those military 
organisations exercise extraordinary power”, meaning that dominating the means of violence 
can easily be converted into wielding considerable influence also within the civilian spheres 
of these states.39 Moreover, returning to Tilly’s “idealized sequence”, quoted at length in 
section 2.3, Tilly mentions the rise of war-industries, schools and other functions within the 
state-apparatus as by-products of the four state-activities of war-making, state-making, 
protection and extraction.40
                                                 
38 Tilly (1985) p.186. 
 With the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps engaging heavily in 
all four of these state-activities, it is perhaps only to be expected that the IRGC also came to 
exert substantial influence over the arms industry, the educational sector and other spheres 
within the emerging post-revolutionary Iranian state. Dominating the means of organised 
violence, which is the precondition for successfully carrying out Tilly’s four activities, then 
provides a reasonable explanation for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also occupying 
such a central role in the overall outcome of the Iranian state-building process that took place 
in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. I will return to the expanding roles of the IRGC into fields 
39 Tilly (1985) p.186. 
40 Tilly (1985) p.183. 
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like industry, education and the economy in chapter 6, but before jumping that far ahead, I 
will start out by depicting the background and the main events of the 1978-79 Iranian 
Revolution, an event of paramount importance to understand the subsequent rise of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq War. 
 
3 Born by Revolution: Historical backdrop and the creation of the IRGC 
The birth of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was closely tied to the events of the 
1978-79 Iranian Revolution. The different forces that united to overthrow the regime of 
Mohammed Reza Shah were many and with diverging agendas, and as soon as the Revolution 
had prevailed, the coalition began to give way to internal disagreements over the future 
direction of the Iranian state. It was against this backdrop of revolutionary turmoil that 
Ayatollah Khomeini on 5 May 1979 issued a decree for the creation of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and as its name implies, the IRGC was charged with 
safeguarding the gains of what increasingly became known as the “Islamic” Revolution. From 
its inception the Revolutionary Guard enjoyed a close relationship with the political forces 
closest to Khomeini. The IRGC was however but one of many organisations vying for 
influence in the wake of the 1978-79 Revolution, and it was not a given that the 
Revolutionary Guard would develop into such a powerful institution within the new Iranian 
state. The advent of the Iraqi invasion in 1980 exerted a considerable influence on the 
emerging structures of the Islamic Republic, and in order to gain a better understanding of the 
War as well as the early developments of the IRGC, the background of Iranian Revolution 
becomes a natural place to start my analysis. 
 
3.1 The background of the Revolution: The authoritarian regime of Mohammed Reza 
Shah 
The roots of the 1978-79 Revolution can be traced way back in Iranian history. It can be 
argued to be the result of an Iranian political awakening which was initiated by the earlier 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905, or be seen as the culmination of a battle to rid the country 
of foreign influence that started early in the 1800s with the infringements made on Persian 
sovereignty and territory by the expanding colonial powers of Great Britain and Russia. These 
events, along with many others, are no doubt important in Iranian history, and the long term 
19 
 
processes of political awakening and struggle against foreign domination remain important 
underlying factors of the 1978-79 Revolution. However for the purpose of this paper I will 
focus on the more immediate background of the wave of protests and upheavals that swept 
through Iran in 1978 and 1979, eventually resulting in the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and giving birth to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
 
The success of the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution meant the downfall of the regime of 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was to be the last Shah of Iran. The Pahlavi-dynasty was 
founded by Mohammed Reza’s father, Reza Shah, who after being one of the key participants 
in a successful governmental coup in February 1921 had secured increasingly more power in 
his own hands before deposing of the existing Qajar-dynasty and grabbing the Iranian throne 
for himself in 1925. Reza Shah had developed an increasingly authoritarian political system, 
until he was forced to abdicate following the Allied occupation of Iran in August 1941 during 
the Second World War.41 Reza Shah had made no secret of his pro-German sympathies 
leading up to the war, and when the Allies made the decision to secure Iran for Allied war 
purposes, not least as a strategically important supply route to the Soviet Union, he was 
accordingly removed from power.42 Reza Shah’s son, the then 21-years old Mohammed Reza, 
was however allowed to inherit the office of Shah after his father, and was installed on the 
Iranian throne on 17 September 1941.43
 
 The Allies at first encouraged an opening of the 
Iranian political system, but with the international climate shifting from World War to Cold 
War and with the popular elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq leading a 
movement for the nationalisation of the Iranian oil reserves, Great Britain and the US felt 
their interests in the Gulf-region threatened. They found the rather politically sidelined 
Mohammed Reza Shah a willing ally, and after a CIA-instigated coup against the Mosaddeq-
government in August 1953, the Shah was brought back in charge and with American help 
started monopolising power over Iranian society. 
Mohammed Reza Shah thus had to endure the stigma of being installed as Iranian ruler by 
foreign powers, and by many of his opponents he was denounced as little more than an 
                                                 
41 Ansari, Ali M. (2003): Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After p.83. 
42 Keddie, Nikki R. (2006): Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution p.101. 
43 Some consideration was given to the restoration of the Qajar-dynasty, but this proved unpractical as the 
remaining Qajar heir was serving in the Royal Navy and had a poor command of Farsi, see Ansari (2003) p.83. 
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“American puppet”. There is no doubt that the Shah relied heavily on American backing to 
keep in power, and the US also increasingly came to view the Shah as an important ally in the 
Gulf. To secure his grip over Iranian society and keep domestic political dissent to a 
minimum, the Shah was helped by the US in setting up the notorious internal security 
services, the SAVAK, in 1957, which received training and technical assistance from the CIA 
and FBI as well as the Israeli intelligence service. In addition Mohammed Reza, much like his 
father, cultivated the rise and expansion of the armed forces as the base of his political power, 
and with the help of the US the size of the Army was increased from some 120,000 to over 
200,000 men in the decade from 1953 to 1963, and by 1977 it totalled some 410,000 men, 
making Iran the strongest military power in the region.44 In return for American aid and 
equipment, the Shah followed an overwhelmingly pro-Western policy, bringing Iran into the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955, and by 1968, when Great Britain announced that it would no longer be 
able to service its imperial obligations east of Suez after 1971, the Shah was anxious to flex 
his military muscle and fill the gap.45 The British and American governments were more than 
happy to see an allied Iran taking responsibility for the security of the Persian Gulf, and from 
1972 the Nixon administration encouraged the Shah to take on this role by agreeing to sell 
him whatever sophisticated military equipment he wanted short of nuclear armaments.46
 
 
Leaning on a heavy flow of oil-income, especially after the oil crisis of 1973 (in which the 
Shah himself played a key role), the Shah thus kept in power by relying on American support, 
the might of his Army and strict political suppression of the increasingly discontent Iranian 
people. 
Mohammed Reza Shah’s domestic policy also provoked widespread opposition among the 
Iranian population. One of his most unpopular decisions, which also seemed to confirm his 
dependency on the US, was when the Shah in 1964 granted the passing of a bill guaranteeing 
legal immunity to all American “government” personnel in Iran. The bill was widely 
criticized as a return to the age of foreign capitulations, and was condemned among others by 
the increasingly more popular and politically active Ayatollah Khomeini, who was sent into 
exile shortly thereafter.47
                                                 
44 Abrahamian (1982) p.419-20, 435. 
 Through the better part of his reign the Shah, again much like his 
45 Ansari, Ali M. (2006): Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change p.59. 
46 Keddie (2006) p.163-4. 
47 When a $200 million US-loan to Iran was accepted the same day as the immunities bill was passed, many 
concluded that the Shah had sold Iranian sovereignty to the Americans. See Ansari (2006) p.49-51. 
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father, followed a policy of attempting to modernise Iran along Western lines. This was seen 
not least in the policy plan he launched with much fanfare in 1963, which the Shah simply 
referred to as “The White Revolution”. This “revolution from above” was intended to initiate 
and complete a social and political transformation of the country, but in the end did little to 
address the plights of the population. Ayatollah Khomeini voiced strong opposition against 
the White Revolution, attacking it among other things for the seizure of private property 
entailed in the land reform and the granting of voting rights to women.48 The Shah’s policies 
also brought with them an increasing cultural Westernisation which was resented by many 
segments of the Iranian population, not least the bazaaris and the ulama (Islamic clergy), 
whose prestige and positions were attacked. Western immigrants, movies, clothing and habits 
were transforming the traditional Iranian society, and for many Iranians Western culture came 
to be associated with moral decay.49 The battle against “Westoxication” increasingly became 
linked with the opposition against the Shah’s American-friendly regime, and in many ways 
the 1978-79 Revolution came to be defined against the US as well as the Shah.50
 
 The US-
hostage crisis that followed in the wake of the Revolution must be seen in this light. In the end 
the Shah’s failure to win-over large segments of the Iranian population with his domestic as 
well as foreign policies, combined with his own extravagant and luxurious lifestyle, made him 
increasingly more alienated and unpopular among the Iranian masses. Mohammed Reza’s rule 
was coming under attack from a whole range of actors demanding changes in Iranian society; 
forces with different goals and agendas, but united in their common opposition against the 
Shah’s autocratic regime. 
3.2 Different forces and ideologies behind the Revolution 
The complex chain of events that initiated what was to be known as the 1978-79 Iranian 
Revolution can hardly be done justice to in this relatively short analysis. Like many other 
revolutions the rapidly evolving dynamics of the situation tend to leave observers bewildered, 
and in any case the true nature and characteristics of the Iranian Revolution still remain 
contested and contentious. It is however clear that the Revolution was a defining moment of 
momentous importance to Iranian society, and the riots that broke out in Qom in January 1978 
                                                 
48 Ansari (2006) p.35-7. 
49 Keddie (2006) p.188-9. 
50 The term ”Westoxication” (Gharbzadegi) first appeared in the 1960s  in the writings of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, 
whose ideas were later taken up and developed further by ideologists like Ali Shariati and played an important 
part in the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution. 
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are often cited as the beginning of the unravelling of the Shah’s regime. These uprisings 
followed the publication of a newspaper article attacking Ayatollah Khomeini, who by this 
time had become the very symbol of royalist opposition from his exile in Iraq and later 
Paris.51 The initial protests seemed almost trivial, and could probably easily have been put 
down by the Shah’s extensive security apparatus, which seemed bigger and stronger than ever 
in the eyes of many foreign observers. In the event the Shah however seemed unsecure and 
unable to act promptly, and hesitated to give the orders for the Army to attack and disperse 
the crowds. Perhaps influenced by then US President Carter’s new emphasis on human rights, 
the Shah was reluctant to openly apply force on his own population, and even went as far as 
“recognising” the Revolution and turning on his own supporters in an effort to appease the 
demonstrators.52
 
 As the uprisings and demonstrations spread throughout the country in 1978 it 
however became clear that the days of the Shah’s regime were numbered, and with 
approximately two million people rallying in the streets of Tehran, the Shah fled the country 
in the middle of January 1979. Soon thereafter, on February 1, Ayatollah Khomeini returned 
triumphantly from his exile and was greeted as a hero by the cheering crowds, and soon 
declared the victory of the Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The Iranian people had risen up against the Shah, but although most accepted Khomeini as a 
unifying symbol of the Revolution, the crowds were driven by a large array of different 
ideologies, and had very different views on the future structure and organisation of the new 
Iranian state. 
The main elements uniting against the Shah’s regime can roughly be divided into three 
different groups; the modern middle class, the traditional middle class and the working-
class.53
                                                 
51 Dating the beginning of the Revolution to these riots in Qom is of course a major simplification of a very 
complex process. For example, Ervand Abrahamian argues that the first sparks of the Revolution can be found 
earlier, in clashes between the police and students that broke out after a series of politically centered poetry-
reading sessions at Aryamehr University on 19 November 1977, see Abrahamian (1982) p.505-6. 
 The modern middle class consisted of the part of the population that had been trained 
and educated by the Pahlavi-state’s new modern institutions. These often Western-influenced 
students and technocrats were dissatisfied with the lack of political freedoms and 
opportunities under the Shah’s rule, and played a very important role in initialising the 
Revolution through the circulation of open protest-letters and organisation of opposition 
52 Ansari (2006) p.40-1. 
53 Based on Workman, W. Thom (1994): The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War p.43-51. 
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groups and rallies against the regime after police control was relaxed in Iran in 1977.54 The 
traditional middle class however provided the revolutionary movement with the required mass 
mobilisation of the population. The main components of this class, the ulama and the 
bazaaris, were traditional forces who felt their prestige severely threatened by the Shah’s 
policies of modernisation and secularisation. The rise of large government-owned industrial 
enterprises, banks and Iran’s integration into the world-market combined to undermine the 
position of the bazaari merchants, while the clergy experienced growing frustration as many 
of their traditional functions and sources of influence over society, like providing education 
and judicial responsibilities, were taken over by state-driven institutions like schools and 
secular courts. The bazaaris and the ulama had historically enjoyed a close-knit relationship, 
and once again they found themselves natural allies against the policies of the Pahlavi-state. 
They therefore wasted little time in utilising their extensive networks, especially the ulama’s 
religious networks and easy access to large crowds through mosque-services and religious 
decrees (fatwas), to mobilise opposition on a massive scale against the Shah’s regime when 
the opportunity arose throughout 1978 and into 1979.55
 
 
A third group that also figured prominently in the revolutionary struggle was the working 
class. Although the importance of this group’s contribution to the revolutionary effort is 
somewhat contested, Ervand Abrahamian concludes that “[i]f the two middle classes were the 
main bulwarks of the revolution, the urban working class was its chief battering ram.”56 The 
Iranian working class was largely a result of the Pahlavi-state’s industrialisation policies, and 
suffered from poor, often hazardous, working-conditions and a lack of rights and labour-
regulations under the autocratic rule of the Shah. Somewhat absent from the early uprisings, 
the working class increasingly brought its full weight to bare on the regime from the summer 
of 1978, crippling the economy by calling massive strikes in the oil-, transport- and factory-
industries, providing much of the youth that defiantly challenged the military authorities, 
many of the martyrs of the revolutionary struggle, and the bulk of the vast crowds that 
marched in the streets demanding the Shah’s resignation.57
 
 
                                                 
54 Workman (1994) p.43-5, Abrahamian (1982) p.500-4. 
55 Abrahamian (1982) p.506-10, Workman (1994) p.46-50. 
56 Abrahamian (1982) p.535. 
57 Workman (1994) p.50-2, Abrahamian (1982) p.510-18, 535. 
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The opposition groups that united against the Shah in the 1978-79 Revolution were also 
largely driven by three different, although often overlapping, ideological threads shaping their 
expectations for post-revolutionary Iran. The first was represented by liberal-bourgeois 
political parties, like the National Front and the Freedom Movement headed by Mehdi 
Bazargan, who was appointed as leader of the Provisional Revolutionary Government by 
Ayatollah Khomeini following the triumph of the Revolution in February 1979. These parties 
drew most of their members from the modern middle class and saw the Revolution as a shift 
from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democratic system, emphasising freedom from 
repression and individual rights like the right to private enterprise and property.58 On the other 
side of the political scale were parties on the left, mostly made up of and supported by 
students and some intellectuals and workers. The biggest of these parties was the Tudeh-party, 
followed by the more militant Fedaiyen-e Khalq and “Islamic Marxist” Mujahedin-e Khalq 
(MEK). Parties on the left ranged from Stalinist to Maoist to Trotskyist, and from adhering to 
secularist to strict Islamic doctrines, but most of them shared the view of the Revolution as a 
radical transformation of Iran’s socioeconomic structure, and propagated the nationalisation 
of key industrial sectors and the removal of all imperialist ties.59
 
 
The third ideological strand underpinning the Revolution was represented by the 
fundamentalist ulama, and drew its support heavily from the traditional middle class and the 
rural and urban poor. Although the ulama by no means constituted a unified political group, 
with some supporting a liberal democratic political system while still others were leaning 
towards the left, many of the most prominent members of the clergy supported the program of 
the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), created with the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
February 1979.60 The IRP called for the establishment of an Islamic Republic along the lines 
of Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih, rule of the Islamic jurist, a doctrine which also 
enjoyed considerable support among various factions both on the right and the left side of the 
political spectrum. Among the IRP’s most influential members were Ayatollah Behesti, 
Ayatollah Mosavi Ardbili, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, and Hojjatislams Khamenei, Bahonar 
and Hashemi Rafsanjani.61
                                                 
58 Workman (1994) p.90-1. 
 When the alliance of forces behind the Revolution began to give 
way to ideological disagreements over what was to replace the Pahlavi monarchy, the 
59 Keddie (2006) p.243, Workman (1994) p.91-2. 
60 Keddie (2006) p.243-4. 
61 Workman (1994) p.92, Keddie (2006) p.244. 
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fundamentalist ulama and the IRP used a number of methods to undermine the opposition; 
making use of their extensive religious networks to mobilise crowds, appointing IRP friendly 
officials to important posts, controlling propaganda networks, playing on the popularity of 
Ayatollah Khomeini himself, and, not least, intimidating competitors through the control of 
armed revolutionary organisations like the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. 
 
3.3 Created by decree: The relationship between the IRGC and the Ayatollahs 
Shortly after declaring the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini 
issued a decree to the Revolutionary Council, an institution created and dominated by 
Khomeinists which functioned almost as a shadow government in parallel with the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government headed by Mehdi Bazargan, for the creation of a 
popular militia to protect against possible counterrevolutionary threats. On 5 May 1979 the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was officially created, and the envisioned role of the 
IRGC was soon thereafter expressed in the constitution of the new Islamic Republic of Iran, 
ratified on 15 November 1979, where article 150 reads as follows: 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, organized in the early days of the triumph of the Revolution, 
is to be maintained so that it may continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements. 
The scope of duties of the Corps, and its areas of responsibility, in relation to the duties and areas of 
responsibility of the other armed forces, are to be determined by law, with emphasis on brotherly 
cooperation and harmony among them.62
 
 
The primary function of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was thus defined as 
protecting the gains of the Revolution, a task open to wide interpretation and that with time 
would warrant the penetration of the IRGC into many fields of activity within the Iranian 
state. The creation and later expansion of the IRGC also largely seems to conform to the 
pattern noted by Adelman whereby new and powerful armies rise to prominence during the 
course of a revolution. In conjunction with Adelman’s framework, the IRGC was assigned 
many important tasks within the post-revolutionary Iranian state, and the Khomeini-
dominated Revolutionary Council further specified the functions of the Revolutionary Guard 
to encompass a wide range of duties within eight broad fields of activity: 
                                                 
62 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (1979), English translation, available online at [URL] 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch09.php  
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• assisting police and security forces in the apprehension or liquidation of 
counterrevolutionary elements 
• battling armed counterrevolutionaries 
• defending against attacks and the activities of foreign forces inside the country 
• coordinating and cooperating with the country’s armed forces 
• training subordinate IRGC personnel in moral, ideological, and politico-military 
matters 
• assisting the Islamic Republic in the implementation of the Islamic Revolution 
• supporting liberation movements and their call for justice of the oppressed people of 
the world under the tutelage of the leader of the Revolution of the Islamic Republic 
• utilising the human resources and expertise of the IRGC to deal with national 
calamities and unexpected catastrophes and supporting the developmental plans of the 
Islamic Republic to completely maximize the IRGC’s resources.63
 
 
In practice however, the IRGC would develop to take on even additional responsibilities to 
those listed above and expand into many fields of activity probably not envisaged by its 
creators, which I will return to and discuss at length in the following chapters. 
 
As already mentioned, the Revolutionary Guard was closely tied to Ayatollah Khomeini and 
dedicated to his Islamic ideology and view of the Revolution. This is not surprising given the 
fact that the IRGC was created by order from Khomeini himself, and many of Khomeini’s 
closest associates in the IRP enjoyed close relations with the leadership of the Revolutionary 
Guard. The Revolutionary Guard’s armed forces provided the IRP with the means to force 
through their decrees and policies, undermining their political competitors and aiding the 
fundamentalist ulama in securing their vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran.64
                                                 
63 Wehrey et al. (2009) p.20-1. 
 With time, the 
Khomeinists came to rely heavily on the IRGC to expand and retain their power over Iranian 
society, and the Revolutionary Guard in turn relied on the fundamentalist ulama to back the 
further increase of the IRGC’s influence, responsibilities and importance within the new 
Iranian state. As will be shown throughout this paper, the close relationship between the 
political camp of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps lead to the 
rise of both to dominate the new Iranian state-structure, a point that should not be forgotten 
even though this analysis is mainly focused on the development of the Revolutionary Guard 
64 Workman (1994) p.92. 
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alone. It was however not a given that the IRGC would become such an important institution 
within the new Iranian state, as from its creation in 1979 the IRGC constituted but one of a 
wide array of armed groups and security forces that vied for influence in the revolutionary 
turmoil that followed the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
3.4 Revolutionary turmoil: The IRGC and other armed revolutionary organisations 
In the chaotic aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, the IRGC was just one of several armed 
organisations competing for power within the post-revolutionary state. Many of the forces that 
had helped toppled the Shah’s regime, like the Fedaiyen-e Khalq and Mujahedin-e Khalq, had 
employed their own organised militias in the struggle, and many more armed groups were 
created more or less spontaneously during the course of the Revolution, as the raiding of 
armouries and army barracks made weapons widely available to opposition groups.65 The 
existence of many independent armed groupings certainly represented a potential threat to any 
one political faction trying to impose its authority over the post-revolutionary Iranian state, 
and the proficiency of the many Khomeini-friendly Islamist paramilitary organisations in 
street violence and the forcible silencing of dissent became an important source of power for 
the fundamentalist ulama. The Khomeinist IRP had ties to many of the newly created militias, 
among others to the violent groups called hezbollah, that were used to disrupt demonstrations 
and attack dissidents.66 Like the IRGC, these groups generally operated outside of the sphere 
and jurisdiction of the regular police and army forces controlled by the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of Bazargan, further undermining Bazargan’s ability to control 
developments within Iran.67
 
 
Although eventually growing to become the most important of the Islamist paramilitary 
organisations, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps faced its fair share of competitors in 
enforcing revolutionary ideals. A particular challenge to the IRGC’s authority was posed by 
the komitehs (committees), makeshift, freelance bands of local Islamists that took control and 
allocated to themselves the powers of justice and administration over assorted 
neighbourhoods throughout the major cities of the Islamic Republic. In Tehran alone roughly 
1,000 komitehs operated in the months following the collapse of the Shah’s regime, arbitrarily 
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arresting anyone they deemed posing a threat to the ideals of the Revolution. Although the 
komitehs and the IRGC essentially drew their members from the same pool of volunteers, 
there was often friction and disagreements between them.68 In the early days of the 
Revolution considerable influence also resided with the local “revolutionary tribunals”, 
organisations that sprung up around the country and functioned as de facto courts, summarily 
trying and executing thousands of people suspected of counterrevolutionary activity.69
 
 The 
triumph of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps over these other organisations and centres 
of power was never preordained, but ultimately derived from the IRGC’s superior 
effectiveness as a guard for the emerging revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
demonstrated thoroughly during the course of the all-important Iran-Iraq War. 
3.5 From Revolution to War 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 was closely linked to events sat in motion by the 
1978-79 Iranian Revolution. In line with Skocpol’s findings, the Revolution markedly 
increased the risk of war due to both threats and opportunities perceived by the neighbouring 
Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. In short, the slide to war was caused on the one hand by 
efforts by the Iranian revolutionary regime to incite a religious uprising in Iraq, especially 
appealing to the numerically superior Shia part of the population, sparking resentment among 
the Sunni-dominated elites of the ruling Iraqi Ba’th-party. Iran’s dedicated revolutionaries, 
much like the French and Russians before them, wanted to spread their revolutionary message 
throughout the neighbouring region, alarming not only the Iraqi regime but also the 
surrounding Arab monarchies and sheikdoms of the Gulf. On the other hand, the War was a 
result of Saddam Hussein’s perception of a historic “window of opportunity” for asserting 
Iraq’s role as the leading state in the Gulf-region and settling old scores with Iran. More 
specifically, Saddam Hussein wanted to readdress the grievances forced upon Iraq in the 1975 
Algiers Accords, in which the military superior Iran of Mohammed Reza Shah had claimed 
extended sovereignty over the contested Shatt-al Arab waterway located at the border 
between the two countries. Saddam calculated that a short and decisive military operation 
would force the seemingly shaky and insecure Iranian regime to accept a peace on Iraqi terms, 
acknowledging Iraqi superiority and full sovereignty over the Shatt-al Arab. The Iraqi 
leadership even entertained hopes that the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan with its 
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sizeable Arab population would rebel and could be “liberated” by the Iraqi war effort.70
 
 After 
some minor border clashes, Saddam Hussein therefore publicly declared the 1975 Algiers 
agreement null and void and ordered the Iraqi army to start its military assault on Iran on 22 
September 1980. 
Saddam Hussein’s assessment of the situation was not totally unfounded, as the Iranian 
Revolution markedly had reduced Iran’s military capabilities. The powerful Iranian Army of 
Mohammed Reza Shah had eventually opted to declare its neutrality in the course of the 
1978-79 Revolution, and thus continued to exist as an organisation, but it had nonetheless 
been drastically reduced in numbers in the period preceding the War due to large-scale 
desertions and purges following the victory of the Revolution. As mentioned, the Iranian 
military had been one of the main pillars upon which the Shah’s power had rested, and it was 
largely viewed as an instrument of oppression, a symbol of Iran’s reliance on the US and an 
unnecessary expenditure by Iran’s revolutionaries. It was also seen as one of the most 
dangerous sources of potential counter-revolution, and indeed there had been several 
attempted military coups against the Islamic Republic before the War, the last and most 
serious one in July 1980, adding to the revolutionary regime’s distrust of the Army.71 As a 
result, the Army was down from 285,000 to around 150,000 troops at the outbreak of 
hostilities.72 Perhaps even more damaging for the Iranian Army’s ability to conduct military 
operations was the forced removal of some 12,000 skilled and trained officers, constituting 
between 30 and 50 percent of the Iranian officer corps from the rank of major to colonel.73
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The lack of expertise was further compounded by equipment being neglected and military 
installations being shut down by the revolutionary regime during its first years in power, 
which were spent securing the revolution at home rather than contemplating attacks from 
abroad, as I will return to in chapter 5. In spite of these difficulties on the Iranian side 
however, Saddam Hussein’s gamble that the time was ripe to strike a blow to his next door 
neighbour was to prove a major miscalculation. For the fundamentalist ulama the War was 
treated as the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the resilience and vitality of the Iranian 
Revolution to the world, and at the same time served to divert the population’s attention away 
71 Chubin & Tripp (1988) p.35. 
72 Karsh, Efraim (2002): Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 p.19. 
73 Chubin & Tripp (1988) p.33. 
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from the internal political infighting that had plagued the Revolution’s early period.74
 
 
Khomeini and the fundamentalist ulama framed the Iraqi attack as a “war against Islam”, and 
as the Iranian people quickly mobilised and rallied to the defence of their country with great 
patriotic zeal, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps developed to take on the size and shape 
of a full-fledged conventional army to counter the Iraqi threat posed against the gains of the 
Islamic Revolution. 
4 Raised by War: The IRGC and the Iran-Iraq War 
The rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, like the formation of the post-
revolutionary Iranian state as whole, was heavily influenced by the momentous impact of the 
eight years long War with Iraq from 1980 to 1988. During the course of the War the IRGC 
developed from a relatively small, makeshift militia, mainly concerned with the internal 
affairs of the Islamic Republic, to a large, well-organised army engaging in intense 
international warfare, or war-making following Tilly’s terminology. The IRGC grew to 
outnumber the regular Iranian Army, and was heavily favoured and praised by the 
revolutionary regime, even though the IRGC’s performance on the battlefield must be said to 
have been mixed at best. Nevertheless the Revolutionary Guard could take pride over the 
important and committed role it had played in the “sacred defence” of the Islamic Republic, 
and at the end of the War the IRGC clearly stood out as one of the most powerful and 
influential organisations within the Iranian state-structure. 
 
4.1 The IRGC and the regular Iranian Army 
As mentioned, one of the hallmarks of the emerging post-revolutionary Iranian regime was 
the balancing of different institutions to keep each other in check, and this was perhaps most 
clearly seen in the competition between the regular Iranian Army, the Artesh, and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps. These organisations were however originally charged with 
different missions as the Revolutionary Guards were primarily meant to be the guardians of 
the Revolution domestically and little attention was paid to the need for external defence in 
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the early days after the fall of the Shah’s regime.75
 
 The IRGC was thus largely focused on 
internal threats to the Islamic Republic and the Revolution, as I will come back to in the next 
chapter, as opposed to the strictly external focus of the regular Iranian Army inherited from 
the Shah’s days. The Iraqi invasion however quickly prompted the revolutionary regime, and 
especially the IRP, to advocate the rise and expansion of the Revolutionary Guards to conduct 
large-scale military combat operations, unwilling to leave the faith of the Islamic Republic in 
the hands of the still strongly distrusted remnants of the professional and modernised Army of 
the Shah. The War thus became a defining moment for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps, greatly expanding its responsibilities and importance within the emerging Iranian 
state-structure. 
Relations between the IRGC and the regular Army throughout the War remained tainted by 
mutual suspicions, resentments, political differences and uncertainty. A particularly recurring 
point of contention between the two organisations concerned the reliance on different military 
tactics, the professional military insisting on well-planned and well-organised operations, 
while the ideologically driven Revolutionary Guards argued that zeal, determination and 
superiority in manpower were enough.76
Unlike the army [...] the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps is in charge of safeguarding the revolution 
and its gains [...]. we in the Revolution Guards give primary importance to the ideological and political 
dimensions more than the military ones.
 Commenting on the difference between the two 
institutions, IRGC commander Mohsen Reza’i asserted that: 
77
The IRGC saw itself as embodying the spirit of the Iranian Revolution, where the will and 
dedication of the Iranian people had won out over the professional, modern and “culturally 
contaminated” security organisations of the Shah, and sought to prosecute the War against 
Iraq along the same lines.
 
78
                                                 
75 Chubin & Tripp (1988) p. 36. 
 This in practice meant a heavy reliance on lightly armed and 
manpower-intensive infantry attacks, while the regular Army stressed the importance of 
conventional tactics incorporating modern, mechanised means of warfare. The constant 
rivalry severely complicated the ability of the IRGC and the Army to perform joint combat 
76 Ansari (2003) p.234. 
77 Mohsen Reza’i, quoted in Chubin & Tripp (1988) p.44. 
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operations, and with the IRP tightening its grip over Iranian society, the Revolutionary Guards 
increasingly got the last say in the planning and execution of the Iranian war effort. 
 
The already close relationship between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 
fundamentalist ulama became even more apparent in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. The 
“Islamification” of the War propounded by Khomeini and his associates in the IRP served to 
sustain the population’s revolutionary fervour, channelling mass popular support into the 
IRGC and the war effort against Iraq.79 As will be shown in the next chapter, the War also 
provided the IRP with a convenient pretext to silence their critics and marginalise all internal 
opposition, and at the same time warranted the enlargement of the IRGC for the dual task of 
fighting Iraq and keeping a check on the regular Iranian Army.80 Although the regular Army 
no doubt played an important role in the defence of Iran, the emerging revolutionary regime 
made no secret of its preference for the Revolutionary Guards, Khomeini in 1982 referring to 
the IRGC as the “solid pillar” of the Islamic Republic, and Ali Khamenei, then President and 
later Supreme Leader of Iran, in 1984 accrediting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
with “a determining role in the process of revolution”.81
 
 The IRGC also enjoyed numerous 
privileges over the Artesh, including superior pay and benefits, first call upon available arms 
and spare parts and better access to the civilian leadership. And with the Iranian population 
rushing to the defence of their country, the IRGC, absorbing and organising the thousands of 
highly motivated volunteers that flocked to the warfront, soon developed from a revolutionary 
militia into an organised armed force outnumbering and rivalling the structure of the regular 
Iranian Army. 
4.2 From militia to full-fledged army: Organisational development of the IRGC and the 
Basij 
As the Iran-Iraq War greatly increased the responsibilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps, it became necessary for the IRGC to develop a structure along the lines of a 
conventional army to absorb the substantial increases in manpower needed to effectively 
perform the task of engaging in international warfare. Originating from hastily gathered and 
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disorganised armed bands and supporters of Khomeini in the early period of the Revolution, 
the IRGC during the War grew into an organised professional institution with a formal 
command chain, recruitment and training structures, its own ministry, access to large reserves 
of manpower through the Basij-forces, and even established its own air- and naval forces to 
rival those of the regular Iranian Army. The extensive numerical increase in IRGC forces 
alone testify to the Revolutionary Guard’s rise in power and influence during the War, 
doubling from some 20,000 – 30,000 in 1980 to around 50,000 during the first year of 
warfare, this number further increasing nine-fold by 1987, the total forces of the IRGC 
consisting of close to 450,000 men as the War entered its final year.82
 
 
With the expansion of the IRGC’s role into military operations it developed a structure 
resembling that of the regular Iranian Army with units divided into corps, divisions and 
brigades. Like many other revolutionary armies, the IRGC developed its organisation to 
encompass training programs to absorb and instruct the large number of new recruits. Initially 
some training operations were conducted in cooperation with the regular Army, but the IRGC 
soon instituted their own training programs focusing on Guard tactics and weapons use, 
heavily imbued with the radical Islamic ideology propounded by Khomeini and his closest 
associates. Unlike other revolutionary armies, the formal structures established as the IRGC 
expanded its organisation did not make it “professionalised” and did not dampen its 
ideological zeal, as focus remained on perpetuating revolutionary militancy and retaining 
institutional independence from the regular Army.83
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 The IRGC’s manpower was mobilised 
through local-level branches of the IRGC that were established throughout Iran in parallel 
with the development of the IRGC’s national command structure. Many of the lower-level 
branches grew out of the komitehs or other groups that had seized power in their respective 
areas in the course of the Revolution, and above the local level the IRGC was organised into 
ten administrative regions, largely corresponding to the Iranian provinces. On top of these sat 
the Supreme Council of the Revolutionary Guard and the Guard Commander, formally meant 
to be reporting to the president, but in practice the IRGC has been much more prone to offer 
its loyalty to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, and has in any case enjoyed a large 
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degree of autonomy.84 The IRGC’s hierarchical structure functioned to penetrate Iranian 
society down to the local levels, and in addition to serving at the front many IRGC members 
were also charged with internal security missions, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Guards mobilised in the same region made up corps or divisions when sent to the battlefront, 
and very often Guards from one region had different commanders depending on whether they 
were currently serving at home or at the front.85
 
 
The social base of the IRGC will be treated more thoroughly in chapter 6, however the 
background of the Revolutionary Guard’s leadership will be treated here to explain the 
emergence of the IRGC’s command structure. When the IRGC was created by decree from 
Khomeini in May 1979, its original members consisted of some 6,000 militias who had fought 
the Shah’s regime even before 1978, and many of which had received guerrilla training with 
Palestinian and Lebanese groups. Connections with foreign organisations and militias, with 
the aim of exporting the Islamic Revolution, was to become a hallmark of the IRGC, and 
nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than in Lebanon, where many IRGC members 
were (and continue to be) active in setting up, training and sponsoring Hezbollah, a Shia 
militant group that rose to wield considerable influence in the course of the Lebanese civil 
war (1975-90). Of the IRGC’s original members many belonged to the Mujahedin of the 
Islamic Revolution (MIR), a group loyal to Khomeini that was established in the course of the 
Revolution. Many MIR-members had broken off from the Mujahedin-e Khalq because of the 
MEK’s emphasis on Marxist over Islamic ideology, the MIR strongly supporting the Islamic 
character of the Iranian Revolution. MIR members provided the leadership and the core 
around which the rest of the IRGC formed, and this first group generally tended to be better 
educated and more politically sophisticated than the zealous volunteers that later flocked to 
the IRGC.86 After a rapid turnover in leadership, one of the IRGC’s early organisers and 
former MIR member Mohsen Reza’i was instituted as Revolutionary Guard Commander in 
September 1981, apparently at the Guard’s own behest, a position he was to retain in a period 
far exceeding the timeframe of the Iran-Iraq War.87
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The IRGC’s institutional development was further compounded by the creation of the 
Ministry of the Revolutionary Guard in November 1982, headed throughout the War by 
Mohsen RafiqDust, another of the Guards early organisers. The Ministry’s functions were 
defined as providing for the Guard’s logistics, procurement, finances, legal and personnel 
services and serving as the IRGC’s liaison with the Maljes and the executive branch of the 
government. The Revolutionary Guard Ministry also managed the IRGC’s budgetary and 
financial administration, and serves as a major indicator of the increase in the IRGC’s 
complexity and transition from chaotic revolutionary militia to a more conventional 
organisational structure.88 The establishment of the IRGC Ministry followed directly from the 
Revolutionary Guard’s involvement in the War, but also took on many civilian tasks, as I will 
return to in chapter 6. The creation of the Ministry was also an attempt to put the IRGC under 
stronger civilian control by the political leadership, but by and large the Revolutionary Guard 
resisted intervention in their internal matters and kept control over advancements within their 
own ranks.89 Both Revolutionary Guard Minister RafiqDust and IRGC Commander Reza’i 
were permanent members of the Supreme Defence Council, the body set up to coordinate and 
lead the overall Iranian war effort, and enjoyed a stability of tenure that was not matched by 
their counterparts representing the Artesh in the Council.90
 
 Militarily the IRGC also saw a 
substantial development during the Iran-Iraq War, expanding into many fields previously 
monopolised by the regular Iranian Army. 
Although relying heavily on ideologically zealous manpower in massive infantry attacks, the 
IRGC also grew to incorporate more sophisticated armed services during the course of the 
Iran-Iraq War. The Revolutionary Guard soon developed its own armoured and artillery 
support to reduce its reliance on the better-equipped regular Army within these fields, and 
from September 1986 the IRGC also started with advanced artillery training.91
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 The IRGC 
further rivalled the structure of the Artesh by creating its own Air Force and Naval Forces, 
thus expanding into many areas that had hitherto been the sole domain of the professional 
Iranian military inherited from the Shah’s days. The creation of the IRGC Air Force was 
endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1985, but did not play a significant role in the War due to 
the international arms embargo preventing Iran from importing new weapons or spare parts 
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for the aircrafts left behind by the former Shah’s Air Force. The IRGC Air Force did however 
develop ten missile units responsible for air defence against Iraqi aircraft, and according to 
press rapports it fired several surface-to-surface SCUD missiles against civilian installations 
in Iraq. Despite its moderate participation in the war effort, the establishment of the IRGC Air 
Force nevertheless served as a symbol of the Revolutionary Guard’s increased responsibilities 
and influence, and the IRGC Air Force was to grow bigger and more capable in the years 
following the War’s end. The IRGC Navy however saw more direct action in the Iran-Iraq 
War. Unofficially in existence since 1982, it participated in the successful 1986 Fao offensive 
(as I will return to below), and was formally inaugurated in 1987 to retaliate against Iraqi 
attacks on Iranian shipping and oil. In the last year of the War, from 1987-88, the IRGC Navy 
was lavished with resources and publicity for its challenge to the US naval build-up in the 
Gulf, employing hit-and-run tactics from small naval crafts armed with RPG-7’s and missile 
units armed with Chinese Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles to harass US ships and 
reflagged tankers.92 The IRGC also developed a foreign wing, often referred to as the Quds-
forces, especially dedicated to spreading the ideology of the Revolution outside of the country 
to the wider Middle Eastern region, and these forces were instrumental in the creation of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982.93
 
 
Another important component of the Revolutionary Guard’s military forces was provided by 
the Basij-e Mostazafan, meaning “the mobilisation of the oppressed”. The Basij was a mass 
mobilising popular volunteer militia, created following the call from Ayatollah Khomeini to 
establish a “20 million-man army” to defend the Islamic Republic from both internal and 
external enemies following the Iraqi invasion. Although the Basij as an organisation was 
officially separate from the IRGC during the War and had its own commander, in practice it 
has always been part of the IRGC. The Basij was formally placed under Guard control 1 
January 1981, and the IRGC recruited, organised, trained and commanded all Basij units, 
although it was not until 2007 that the control structure of the Basij was officially merged 
with that of the Revolutionary Guard.94
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 The Basij served as a reserve pool of manpower for 
the IRGC, and military training for basijis generally consisted of a two week instruction 
program in the use of grenades and automatic rifles, heavily imbued with religious and 
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ideological indoctrination with a focus on martyrdom and the promise of heaven for those 
killed in the War. The Basij was originally a volunteer and not a fixed force, whose members 
usually served a brief three month tour before returning to their homes, jobs or studies, and 
seasonal fluctuations made it hard to contemplate the exact capabilities of the basijis.95 The 
Basij nevertheless played an integral part in the Iranian war effort, and although the number 
of readily available basijis probably seldom exceeded 100,000 at any one time, by 1987 some 
3 million Iranians had received Basij training, adding substantially to the potential power of 
the IRGC in a scenario of all-out mobilisation.96
 
 The creation of the Basij was thus another 
development strongly contributing to the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the 
course of the Iran-Iraq war. 
4.3 The IRGC and military operations: Successes and failures in the “sacred defence” 
Giving a detailed account of the eight year long military struggle between Iran and Iraq is 
clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but nevertheless a summary of the War’s main events 
and the role and tactics employed by the IRGC in the war effort is in order.97 As the Iraqi 
leadership had anticipated, the Iranian revolutionaries were caught off guard by the initial 
Iraqi offensives in September 1980, and Iraqi forces successfully occupied portions of Iranian 
territory along the border, encountering little or no co-ordinated resistance. Saddam Hussein 
then decided to halt Iraqi advances, in the belief that he had made his point and that the 
Iranian leaders would accept his terms for peace.98
There is absolutely no question of peace or compromise and we shall never have any discussions with 
them; because they are corrupt and perpetrators of corruption.
 The emerging Iranian regime was however 
unwilling to compromise, and framing the War as a test of the Revolution and a secular 
regime’s attack on Islam, Ayatollah Khomeini rejected any agreements with the Iraqi regime 
out of hand, proclaiming: 
99
Given precious time to organise a counter-attack, the Iranian Army in a combined effort with 
the rapidly expanding Revolutionary Guard and the newly established Basij carried out a 
string of successful military operations beginning in September 1981. Although the Islamic 
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Revolutionary Guard Corps at this time was still in a state of transition to take on its expanded 
responsibilities and probably did not number more than 50,000 men, IRGC Minister 
RafiqDust was later to proclaim that the IRGC’s successes in the War started with its first 
organised offensive that broke the siege of Iran’s southern city of Abadan in late 1981.100 The 
emerging Iranian regime’s preference for the further expansion of the IRGC was clearly seen 
in the budget presented in May the same year, which allocated four times greater the 
resources to the IRGC and other revolutionary organisations than to the regular Iranian 
Army.101 The early Iranian counteroffensives were however coordinated operations that 
combined the conventional warfare tactics of the regular Army with the revolutionary zeal of 
the IRGC and the Basij, and these operations proved quite successful as the last Iraqi forces 
were pushed out of Iranian territory by early summer 1982.102
 
 
The retaking of all captured Iranian territory was a huge success for the Iranian armed forces, 
especially for the regular Army that had planned and taken the leadership in the major Iranian 
counteroffensives. In spite of the extensive purges and distrust, the Iranian Army had proved 
itself in the operations that drove out the Iraqi invaders, but as a reward the regular Army was 
sidelined as the leadership of the war effort was passed to the Revolutionary Guards by the 
emerging Iranian regime.103
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 The IRGC, adopting Khomeini’s uncompromising attitude 
towards the enemy, was determined to continue the War until the regime of Saddam Hussein 
was defeated, and spurred on by their successes in routing the Iraqi occupiers, the Iranian 
forces took the War into Iraqi territory from the middle of July 1982. However disagreements 
over tactics, objectives and use of resources plagued the relations between the Artesh and the 
Revolutionary Guards, complicating the planning, coordination and execution of combined 
military operations. As Khomeini and his associates increasingly secured their grip over the 
Iranian state, they came to rely more heavily on the large-scale “human-wave” infantry 
attacks mounted by the IRGC and the Basij, which came to be seen as a hallmark of the 
unconventional tactics employed by the Revolutionary Guards. In these attacks the less 
trained, lightly armed, but highly ideological motivated basijis were often used as little more 
than cannon fodder, being sent in advance to cross minefields and pave the way for the more 
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heavily armed IRGC forces.104 However, lacking adequate armour, artillery and air support 
these attacks usually failed to breach the heavily fortified Iraqi defence-lines and were 
repulsed with heavy losses, and the next years of the War therefore came to be characterised 
by static warfare, with neither side being able to make any considerable breakthroughs.105 The 
regular Iranian Army was occasionally relied upon when the IRGC made little progress, but 
as soon as the Revolutionary Guard received a small success the Army was once again 
relegated to second position.106 The emerging Iranian regime dominated by the IRP continued 
its almost unequivocal support for the Revolutionary Guards, Rafsanjani describing the Basij 
forces as a “blessing from God”, and then Prime Minister Musavi in 1986 asserting that 
“Today we are stronger than ever. We have the Basij and the Corps”.107
 
 
In an effort to bypass the military stalemate that had developed since 1982 and hoping to wear 
down the opponent’s will, the Iraqis, with the Iranians answering in kind, started targeting 
strategic interests like important economic installations, oil refineries, pipelines and civilian 
population centres in what became known as “the war of the cities”. Shipping bound for the 
other party also became a target as the War spread to the Gulf in what was correspondingly 
dubbed “the tanker war”. It was Saddam Hussein’s hope that the “tanker war” would bring 
stronger international and especially US support against Iran, as the US was dependent on the 
oil-supplies from the area.108 This strategy was partly successful in that it drove the US to 
increase its naval presence in the Gulf, putting Iran under increased pressure, although the 
IRGC Navy, as mentioned earlier, at times seemed eager at the prospect of challenging the 
US, which still was viewed as the principal enemy of the Islamic Revolution. Back on the 
main battlefield the IRGC achieved one of its greatest successes with the capture of the Iraqi 
Fao-peninsula in February 1986, Iran temporarily gaining the upper hand in the War. The 
capture of Fao was a combined operation where the IRGC and the regular Army cooperated 
closer than ever, with the Basij and the IRGC Navy also playing important roles in the 
offensive.109
 
  
                                                 
104 Katzman (1993) p.67. 
105 Chubin & Tripp (1988) p.46-7. 
106 Chubin & Tripp (1988) p.46. 
107 Quoted in Chubin & Tripp (1988) p.45. 
108 Ansari (2006) p. 237, Karsh (2002) p.50. 
109 Katzman (1993) p.66, 90-1. 
40 
 
By the end of 1986 the tide was however starting to turn in Iraq’s favour due to Iraq enjoying 
a steady flow of military supplies, weapons and economic aid from a worldwide array of 
actors fearing the consequences of an Iranian victory in the conflict. The support rendered to 
Iraq ranged from direct monetary assistance provided by Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and other 
Arab states in the region, to access to the latest military technology and equipment from the 
US, the Soviet Union and some Western-European powers.110 Iran, on the other hand, found 
its operational capacity in heavy armaments like artillery, tanks, missiles and aircrafts 
diminishing, being subject to an international arms-embargo denying access to essential spare 
parts and new equipment.111 This allowed Iraq to go on the offensive again, and from mid-
April until summer 1988, Fao and other Iranian positions in Iraq were recaptured, Iraq being 
able to carry the War back into Iranian territory for the first time since 1982. The turning tide, 
enormous costs and dwindling popular support of the War finally compelled the Iranian 
leadership to give up its uncompromising position. Also, by 1988 many of the Guards and 
basijis eager to die for Islam and the Revolution had already done so, and the high Iranian 
casualty-rate could not be sustained much longer.112 On 17 July 1988 it was announced that 
Iran would accept an armistice based on UN Resolution 598, passed by the Security Council 
one year earlier and calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to the 
internationally recognised boundaries between the two countries.113
 
 Thus after eight years of 
heavy fighting and huge costs, the War ended with both sides having to relinquish their 
original war-aims and pretty much settling for the status-quo that had prevailed between them 
before the outbreak of hostilities in 1980. 
The IRGC’s heavy reliance throughout the War on “human-wave” tactics mounted by 
religiously zealous and ideologically committed men of all ages, and especially young boys 
(some of the basijis were reportedly no more than 10-11 years old), have by many outside 
observers been regarded as one of “the worst excesses associated with the ‘Islamic’ way of 
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warfare.”114 To mention but one example of the extreme human costs of these attacks, 
Operation Karbala 4, a major Iranian offensive in the direction of Basra launched on 24 
December 1986, suffered a crushing defeat with the killing of some 10,000 Iranians over the 
short period of only three days.115
They chant “Allahu Akbar” and they keep coming, and we keep shooting, sweeping our 50 millimetre 
machine guns around like sickles. My men are eighteen, nineteen, just a few years older than these kids. 
I’ve seen them crying, and at times the officers have had to kick them back to their guns. Once we had 
Iranian kids cycling towards us, and my men all started laughing, and then these kids started lobbing 
their hand grenades and we stopped laughing and started shooting.
 Another telling story of these attacks is provided by an 
Iraqi officer, describing the effect of these assaults on him and his men:  
116
The Iranian leadership’s willingness to accept huge human losses stemmed in part from the 
desire to demonstrate the dedication of Iranian people and their resolve to carry on the War no 
matter what, hoping this would demoralize their less committed and dedicated foes.
 
117 The 
IRGC-lead “human wave” attacks were however also adopted out of less ideological and 
more pragmatic reasons. While the Iranian armed forces at the beginning of the War could 
draw on the substantial resources left behind by the Shah’s massive military build-up, Iran’s 
capabilities in heavy armaments soon began to dwindle due to the international arms-embargo 
and the resulting lack of spare parts. The development of an indigenous Iranian weapons 
industry, further discussed in chapter 6, partly offset the effects of the arms-embargo, but 
could not compete with the steady flow of supplies enjoyed by the Iraqi armed forces. With 
Iraq thus increasing its superiority in heavy weapons and firepower, Iran’s only strategic 
advantage became that of greater relative strength in mobilised and available manpower.118
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The IRGC’s tactics of massive frontal infantry assaults can therefore be seen as an attempt to 
make the best out of the limited resources available, and in spite of their extreme losses, 
operations of this kind actually also saw some measures of success, one example being the 
mentioned capture of Fao in 1986. In any case, whether condemned for their futility or 
regarded as born out of military necessity, the “human wave” attacks left the world with an 
impression of the Iranian people, and not least the IRGC, as willing to endure heavy sacrifices 
for the sake of the Revolution and its values, and the IRGC could later take pride in its crucial 
role played in the “sacred defence” of the Islamic Republic. 
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4.4 The legacy of the War: Deriving legitimacy from the war effort 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has in later times attempted to cultivate a large 
amount of legitimacy from its performance in the Iran-Iraq War.119 This might seem 
unwarranted in light of the IRGC’s at best mixed successes on the battlefield, and the 
outcome of the War did certainly not conform to the IRGC’s self-proclaimed war-aims. Much 
like its creator and main political ally Ayatollah Khomeini, the IRGC was staunchly opposed 
to ending the conflict with a negotiated agreement, and remained dedicated to the slogan of 
“War until victory”, which was usually defined as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime 
and the export of the Islamic Revolution to Iraq. By 1988 however, a broad political 
consensus was forming around the need to end the War due to the successful Iraqi 
counterattacks, American assaults in the Gulf, the exhaustion caused by the “war of the cities” 
and the difficulty of recruiting volunteers and even conscripts for the Iranian armed forces. 
Political leaders like Khamenei started to emphasise that Iran’s endurance, sacrifices and 
national solidarity throughout the long War meant that Iran had already fulfilled its divine 
mission irrespective of obtaining a final victory, thus favouring an end to the hostilities while 
at the same time sheltering the armed forces and the IRGC of criticism.120 When Khomeini 
was finally convinced by his advisers that it was time to end the long and devastating War, he 
described the decision to forsake his earlier uncompromising position in favour of a 
settlement with the Iraqis as “more deadly than poison”.121 The IRGC reluctantly accepted 
Khomeini’s decision to endorse the armistice, although the relationship between the IRGC 
and many of its long-time political allies in the IRP, like Rafsanjani who advocated strongly 
for the adoption of the ceasefire, was damaged over this issue. Ayatollah Khomeini was 
however careful not to assign blame for the War ending without an Iranian victory, and 
Khomeini’s indispensible support and appreciation of the Revolutionary Guard’s proven 
commitment to his revolutionary message shielded the IRGC’s leadership from much 
criticism in the aftermath of the War.122
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In the end however, the IRGC had to take its share of the responsibility for the many defeats 
inflicted upon Iran leading up to the signing of the 1988 ceasefire, although the rivalry and 
lack of cooperation between the IRGC and the regular Army certainly also was an important 
reason for Iran “losing” the War and finally accepting the armistice.123 In many respects the 
Iran-Iraq War was a disaster for Iran, which was believed to have suffered approximately one 
million casualties124, devastating damages to material and economic infrastructure, and while 
Iraq retained control of some slivers of Iranian territory, the Shatt-al Arab, in many ways the 
primary source of the conflict, remained contested and was anyway made almost inaccessible 
due to the large amounts of destroyed shipping blocking it up.125 The Iranian leadership and 
the IRGC had been forced to abandon the proclaimed war-aims of toppling Saddam Hussein’s 
regime and spreading the Revolution to Iraq, and for many the huge sacrifices endured by the 
Iranian population in the war effort therefore in the end seemed to amount to little. The 
decision to continue the War and go on the offensive in 1982, when a ceasefire similar to the 
one eventually adopted in 1988 was offered by Iraq, remains one of the most contested 
decisions in modern Iranian history.126
 
 In light of these assessments the IRGC and the Iranian 
leadership might seem to have little to show for themselves at the end of the War, however 
focusing on the destructions and lack of victory remains but one side of the many implications 
and effects of the Iran-Iraq War. 
Theorist G. Hossein Razi stresses the importance of performance as a vital part of the concept 
of legitimacy, and the performance of the IRGC during the War, although experiencing both 
successes and failures as outlined above, can also be evaluated in a more positive light.127
If Iraq succeeds in holding out for a return to the status quo ante bellum, it will have withstood a siege 
from a country three times its size. Iran, by contrast, can take little glory from a peace that takes it back 
to the pre-war settlement.
 
Chubin & Tripp, writing before the end of the war in 1988, assert that: 
128
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I however disagree with this assessment in that it fails to consider two important aspects of 
the Iran-Iraq War. First of all, Iraq was the original aggressor in the conflict, hoping to 
readdress the prevailing situation between the two countries, and as such, the return to a pre-
war settlement, which is pretty much what happened in 1988, represented a triumph for the 
IRGC and the Iranian defence in denying Saddam Hussein his original war-aims. Secondly, 
and even more important, Iraq might have withstood the siege of a country three times its 
size, but Iran withstood the attack of a country enjoying at least three times strategic 
superiority in advanced weaponry, financial aid and international support.  
 
As mentioned, the spread of Iranian religious fanaticism was by many countries experienced 
as a greater threat than that represented by the Iraqi Ba’ath dictatorship, and many actors 
therefore opted to back the Iraqi regime in the Iran-Iraq War. To give an indication of the 
balance in heavy military equipment during the final years of the conflict, in 1987 estimates 
put Iraq’s capacities in battle tanks and combat aircrafts at 4,800 and 400-500 respectively, 
while the corresponding numbers for Iran at the time were approximated at 900-1,250 and 80-
105.129 Against these odds, the Iranian achievement of obtaining a peace based on the pre-war 
settlement must be seen in a more favourable light than Chubin & Tripp allow for, and 
certainly the value of this achievement has been cultivated almost like a victory by the Iranian 
regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps themselves. Another factor contributing 
positively to the IRGC’s performance was the fact that the Iran-Iraq War constituted the first 
war in 150 years in which the Iranians had fought without losing territory or relinquishing 
Iranian independence, and through fierce determination and huge sacrifice Iran had inflicted 
defeat upon the invading forces and resisted the pressure from the world’s greatest 
superpowers.130 Although not being able to claim a military victory from the conflict, the 
IRGC could therefore none the less derive a huge amount of prestige from having managed to 
put up a formidable fight in what IRGC Commander Mohsen Reza’i characterised as “the war 
against the whole world”.131
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Another important dimension of legitimacy is whether the population perceive the ruling 
institutions’ authority as rightful, in other words the degree to which a regime or the political 
leadership is viewed as representative of the nation and embodying the values of society.132 
Although a difficult concept to measure accurately, the regime of Khomeini and the IRGC 
must be said to have developed considerably also within this aspect of legitimacy in the 
course of the Iran-Iraq War. As showed earlier, the Iranian people were driven by many 
varying ideologies in the Revolution against the Pahlavi state, and had different views on 
what would represent a new legitimate Iranian state after the fall of the Shah’s regime. 
Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic Republic therefore had its fair share of opponents, and as will 
be shown in the next chapter the Revolutionary Guard originated as a politically motivated 
militia and was instrumental in securing the fundamentalist ulama’s grip over Iranian society. 
At the outset of the 1978-79 Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was very sceptical about the 
merits of Iranian nationalism as an ideology to harness mass popular support, and failed to 
appreciate nationalism as one of the main forces behind the successful uprisings against the 
Shah’s regime; for Khomeini the Revolution was driven by the forces of Islam, its 
constituents was the wider Islamic umma (meaning the world wide community of Muslims), 
and the Revolution’s ideology was thus claimed to be universal and applicable throughout the 
Muslim world. In the course of the eight years long War however, the Khomeinist regime 
increasingly resorted to invoking nationalism as well as religious fervour to motivate its 
troops and populace at home, thus appealing to a wider segment of the Iranian population.133
 
 
During the War, the IRGC also developed to become a truly national actor, defending not just 
its politically likeminded compatriots but the whole country against the Iraqi onslaught. 
Iranians not initially positively inclined towards the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the 
ideology of the fundamentalist ulama therefore to a larger degree found themselves fighting 
for the same basic value of Iranian independence in the face of external danger, and, whether 
they liked it or not, had to acknowledge the IRGC’s very important role in defending the 
Iranian nation. By the end of the War the Khomeinist regime had come more to terms with 
Iranian nationalism, and the Revolutionary Guard, as a symbol of national resistance, came to 
represent the Iranian people to a much larger degree than before the War, adding to its 
legitimacy as one of the new Iranian state’s most powerful institutions. 
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Returning to Tilly’s framework, Tilly binds the concept of legitimacy to the control of the 
means of violence, defining it as follows: 
Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority. 
Other authorities, I would add, are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority 
that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable 
environment recommend that general rule. The rule underscores the importance of the authority's 
monopoly of force. A tendency to monopolies the means of violence makes a government's claim to 
provide protection, in either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more credible and more 
difficult to resist.134
 
 
Following this definition, the rise of the Revolutionary Guard to control substantial armed 
forces in the course of the War in itself worked to increase the IRGC’s legitimacy. As 
mentioned, by the end of the War the IRGC totalled approximately 450,000 men, numerically 
outgrowing the regular Army which consisted of some 200,000 soldiers.135
 
 The IRGC thus 
became the principal institution of organised violence in Iran, and the IRGC’s role in the 
defence of the homeland in turn legitimised the Revolutionary Guard’s claim to provide 
protection, whether desired or not by the population. The IRGC’s rise to dominate the means 
of violence internally will be addressed in the next chapter, however it is clear that both the 
IRGC’s performance in the Iran-Iraq War, its important role in defending the country against 
external attack, and its development into a powerful organisation all served to bolster its 
legitimacy as one of the most influential institutions within the Iranian state-structure. 
Although a highly contested and devastating event, the Iran-Iraq War also brought a sense of 
solidarity, a shared experience of historical dimensions that reinforced the collective spirit of 
the Iranian population. In this sense the War proved to be an empowering experience both for 
the Iranian society and the state, which in contrast to Iraq emerged from the conflict with a 
renewed self-confidence and minimal debt.136
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following World War II, war veterans are gradually dominating Iran’s national affairs, and 
service in the War, particularly within the IRGC, is often seen as an important prerequisite for 
business connections and political prominence.137
 
 The legacy of the War and the important 
part played by the IRGC in the defence of the homeland therefore continues to have far-
reaching consequences for the Iranian state, conforming well to Tilly’s assertion that war-
making remains a very important factor in the process of state-building. 
4.5 Summary: The IRGC, war-making and institutional development 
There is no doubt that the eight year long War with Iraq had a profound influence on the 
emerging post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure, and not least for the rise of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps. Engaging in war-making, understood as one of Tilly’s four state-
activities, prompted the development of the IRGC from a relatively small and domestically 
focused revolutionary militia to become Iran’s largest and most powerful armed force. Mass 
popular support and revolutionary zeal was channelled into the IRGC and the war effort, and 
to take on its new responsibilities the IRGC expanded its organisation to encompass formal 
recruitment and training procedures, a clear command structure, its own Ministry and control 
of the Basij volunteer forces. The IRGC developed along the lines of a conventional military, 
with divisions, corps and brigades, and moved into fields previously dominated by the Artesh 
by establishing its own mechanised forces, artillery units, Air Force and Navy. Numerically 
the Revolutionary Guard expanded to outgrow the regular Iranian Army inherited form the 
Shah’s days, and was strongly favoured by the emerging regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
enjoying superior pay and benefits and first call upon available weaponry and spare parts. 
Although the IRGC’s performance on the battlefield was mixed, it could later bolster its 
legitimacy from the crucial role it played in the “sacred defence” of the Islamic Republic, and 
no doubt by the end of the War the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had risen to become 
the most powerful armed external force of the new Iranian state. However the Iran-Iraq War 
also had a huge effect on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as an internal institution, 
and next I turn to the IRGC’s developing role in “state-making” during the War, meaning the 
elimination and domination of domestic rivals within the emerging post-revolutionary Iranian 
state-structure. 
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5 The War at Home: The IRGC and “State-making” 
On the eve of the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution it was unclear whether Iran would become the 
theocratic regime envisioned by Khomeini or a state controlled by the more moderate forces. 
As mentioned, the coalition that had successfully defeated the regime of Mohammed Reza 
Shah soon gave way to internal disagreements, and in the ensuing revolutionary turmoil the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was but one organisation competing for influence within 
the new post-revolutionary state. The IRGC’s internal role was however greatly expanded in 
parallel with its increased external responsibilities in the course of the Iran-Iraq War, as the 
substantial increases in IRGC manpower markedly changed the internal power-balance 
between the different political factions. The Revolutionary Guard joined forces with 
Khomeini’s associates in the IRP and found the War a useful pretext to silence internal 
opposition and secure their grip over Iranian society. The Revolutionary Guard first played an 
important role in undermining the liberal government of Mehdi Bazargan, before turning 
against the Islamic Republic’s first elected president Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and striking a 
devastating blow to the Iranian forces on the left side of the political spectrum. The IRGC’s 
extensive involvement in state-making, in the Tillyan sense of defeating internal enemies, 
lead to the Revolutionary Guard taking on many internal security and policing functions, 
monopolising the means of violence to a degree that significantly increased the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps’ power and influence within the emerging Islamic Republic of 
Iran. During the War the IRGC also became an important political actor in its own right, 
setting the precedent for later extensive involvement in the civilian political sphere of the 
Iranian state. 
 
5.1 Providing order and preventing internal rebellions 
From its inception on 5 May 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps largely focused on 
ensuring internal security in the post-revolutionary setting. Adhering to the Islamic ideology 
propagated by Ayatollah Khomeini, the IRGC became an important armed instrument for 
consolidating the Revolution’s hold on power, eradicating power-structures left from the 
Shah, administrating revolutionary justice, and preventing and combating potential 
counterrevolution.138
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its achievements”, a responsibility open to wide interpretation and that with time would 
warrant the IRGC’s expansion into many areas within the new Iranian state.139 In the 
immediate period after the Revolution however, the IRGC’s first task was to restore order and 
dislodge other revolutionaries from government buildings and military bases.140 Soon 
thereafter, the IRGC became the principal institution responsible for suppressing uprisings by 
separatist Kurds, Baluchs, and Turkmen, and other groups that rebelled in the turmoil that 
followed the victory of the Revolution. Although operating independently from the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of Bazargan, the IRGC thus performed a vital national 
function in keeping the Iranian territory intact, and all ethnic or partially ethnic risings were 
defeated.141 Strong Kurdish resistance however lead to the Revolutionary Guard adopting 
more of a military structure, a development that was further compounded with the IRGC’s 
expanded external role in the wake of the Iraqi invasion in September 1980. The 
Revolutionary Guards were also given law enforcement authority, ran prisons, protected 
government facilities and served as bodyguards for regime leaders in the early period after the 
Iranian Revolution.142
 
 
It did not take long however before the IRGC, committed to the Islamic ideology conveyed by 
the fundamentalist ulama, found themselves at odds with the liberal Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of Mehdi Bazargan. Although it was Ayatollah Khomeini himself 
who had appointed Bazargan as prime minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, 
he also used his power-base in the Revolutionary Council and the Revolutionary Guard to 
undermine Bazargan’s leadership. This was seen in the Khomeinists frequent use of the IRGC 
to enforce decrees and decisions not favoured by the Bazargan-government, and according to 
Katzman, the IRGC also played an important part in the occupation of the US Embassy in 
Tehran from November 1979 to January 1981, the students responsible for this action 
enjoying close ties to the IRGC and the MIR that constituted the core group of the Guards. 
The Embassy takeover on November 4 sealed Bazargan’s fate by exposing his total lack of 
control over events within Iran, and he and his likeminded Cabinet resigned from their posts a 
few days later.143
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the Revolutionary Guards, and he was not to be the last victim as the fundamentalist ulama 
close to Khomeini and the IRGC made the best out of the circumstances provided by the Iran-
Iraq War and worked together to secure their grip over the post-revolutionary Iranian state-
structure. 
 
5.2 The War and the removal of Bani-Sadr 
The next target of the fundamentalist ulama and the IRGC in their battle to control the 
outcome of the Revolution was the western-educated layman Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, who 
politically belonged closer to the left side of the political spectrum, propagating a somewhat 
Marxist-inspired Islamic ideology, almost drifting towards anarchistic tendencies in his 
political writings.144 Shortly after the fall of Bazargan’s Provisional Revolutionary 
Government, Bani-Sadr was elected as the first president of the Islamic Republic in January 
1980. Bani-Sadr had been a close associate of Khomeini during Khomeini’s exile in France, 
and Khomeini backed his candidacy for the presidency where Bani-Sadr ran as an 
independent and won an overwhelming victory with 10.7 million votes out of a total of 14 
million.145 At the same time however, the IRP dominated the elections to the Maljes, where 
Rafsanjani was elected speaker, and from its power-base here the fundamentalist ulama posed 
a serious challenge to Bani-Sadr’s authority. As president, Bani-Sadr formally controlled the 
country’s armed forces, but like earlier the Revolutionary Guard remained loyal to Khomeini 
alone and actively undermined Bani-Sadr. The IRGC continued its attacks against the Kurds 
despite Bani-Sadr calling for a ceasefire, and cooperated with the US Embassy hostage takers 
to thwart Bani-Sadr’s attempts at negotiating the release of the hostages.146 The Revolutionary 
Guards also broke up pro-Bani-Sadr demonstrations and tacitly approved the ransacking of 
the political headquarters of the IRP’s opponents.147
 
 The Iraqi invasion in September 1980 did 
not make things any easier for Bani-Sadr, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps greatly 
expanded its organisation and responsibilities within the Iranian state. 
In many ways the War came at a good time for Khomeini and his associates, who used it as a 
pretext to increase internal repression, strike hard against their rivals and tighten their grip 
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over the Islamic Republic. The War functioned to keep revolutionary fervour alive, and at the 
same time served to concentrate the minds of the population on the foreign enemy and away 
from domestic political disagreements. According to Bani-Sadr, had there not been a War, he 
and his followers might have triumphed in the internal battle with the fundamentalist ulama in 
the IRP.148 With the War being a fact, Bani-Sadr focused his efforts on the defence of the 
country, and not holding much sway over the IRGC forces, Bani-Sadr opted to reinvigorate 
and rely on the regular Iranian Army to repulse the Iraqi invaders. Bani-Sadr’s role as 
commander of the armed forces was however severely circumscribed with the establishment 
of the Khomeinist-dominated Supreme Defence Council to plan and lead the Iranian war 
effort, and the Revolutionary Guards and the IRP were highly suspect of Bani-Sadr’s close 
relations with the regular Army, seeing this as a possible base for Bani-Sadr instigating a coup 
against them.149
When we wanted to send the IRGC to the battlefronts, this force did not have the necessary military 
formation or organization. The IRGC was not created to defend the country’s borders but rather the 
main aim for the creation of the IRGC was to defend the Islamic revolution. It was at this time that we 
realized that the imposed war was not against our borders but rather that it was aimed against the 
Islamic revolution and was bent on its destruction. Therefore, we felt the need to mobilize the IRGC. 
But when the IRGC wanted to enter the war as a popular force it was faced with problems and obstacles 
put in its way by the ruling clique [of Bani-Sadr] at that time.
 Bani-Sadr and his activities were therefore closely monitored by the IRP as 
they advocated the expansion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to take the lead in 
Iran’s war effort. IRGC Minister Mohsen RafiqDust, commenting on the IRGC’s expanded 
role in the wake of the War, asserts that: 
150
In his political battle with the IRP and the Revolutionary Guard, Bani-Sadr on his side 
complained that “[t]he mullahs had access to the radio, the newspapers, and the Friday 
prayers. We had to do without all of that”.
 
151 Regarding the IRP’s aims, Bani-Sadr asserted 
that “[t]he objective, among other things, was to dominate the army, then disband it and 
replace it with the Revolutionary Guards”, and to achieve this goal the fundamentalist ulama 
made sure available arms went to the IRGC and constantly harassed and talked about the 
regular Iranian Army in negative terms.152
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haphazardly decided to arrest the commander in chief of the Army’s ground forces over his 
purported failure to produce the “correct” papers, Bani-Sadr having to send his own guards to 
obtain the Army officer’s release.153 Bani-Sadr further described how the IRP undermined his 
authority by publishing articles every day that denounced him and the regular Army as 
useless, and passed new laws that meant young men were incorporated into the Basij instead 
of being under his control as commander in chief of the armed forces. Bani-Sadr also claimed 
the fundamentalist ulama purposely advocated the continuation of the War so that they could 
build up the Revolutionary Guard to replace the Army, and even asserted that his own 
appointment as commander in chief of the armed forces was part of a plot by the mullahs to 
discredit him, faced with the overwhelming challenge of responding to the Iraqi invasion with 
only the neglected and disorganised remnants of the Shah’s Army at his disposal.154
  
 Bani-
Sadr’s assessments about his own downfall and political enemies should certainly be treated 
as a truth with moderations, recognising that Bani-Sadr hardly can be regarded as a neutral 
source of information within these areas, but nevertheless his closeness to events provide 
valuable insights into some of the dynamics at work in the early domestic power-struggles 
within the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
In the disputes between the IRP and Bani-Sadr, Ayatollah Khomeini often shifted between 
supporting one side over the other and regularly urged the two sides to compromise, but in the 
spring of 1981 Khomeini finally broke completely with his old friend and associate Abol 
Hassan Bani-Sadr. The constant challenges to his authority and the many disagreements with 
the fundamentalist ulama compelled Bani-Sadr to write a letter to Khomeini where he 
criticised Khomeini’s leadership, and in response Khomeini shortly after made use of his 
constitutional power as Supreme Leader to dismiss Bani-Sadr as president, the pretext being 
the lack of progress made in the War.155
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 Bani-Sadr, fearing persecution from the IRP and the 
Revolutionary Guard, went into hiding on June 15 1981 and soon thereafter fled the country, 
while the armed forces suffered a new round of purges to further remove any potential threats 
to the Khomeinist regime. Bani-Sadr had never tried to create a party or a coalition to back his 
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call for an uprising against the fundamentalist ulama.156
 
 With the removal of Bani-Sadr, the 
IRP however controlled all the major influential political institutions within the post-
revolutionary state, and the MEK and the political left were to be the next targets of the 
clerical regime and the Revolutionary Guards in what increasingly came to resemble a 
coordinated campaign to eliminate all internal rivals within the newly established Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
5.3 Altering the internal power balance: The defeat of the MEK and the Tudeh Party 
Unlike the political factions represented by Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, the remaining Iranian 
leftist groups posed a more serious challenge to the fundamentalist ulama due to their 
possession of well-organised armed militias to back their cause. In the aftermath of the Iranian 
Revolution, the MEK and the Fedaiyen-e Khalq controlled between 15,000 and 20,000 armed 
guerrillas, and even the Tudeh party, which generally abstained from the use of violence, had 
some 7,000 armed men and women in Tehran alone. Together these forces roughly equalled 
the size of the many Islamic paramilitary groups which numbered some 20,000 fighters in 
total, and in addition to this another 20,000 armed Iranians were in the streets after the 
military armouries were looted following the fall of the Shah.157 The Islamic groups however 
lacked the structure and coherence of the leftist forces, and the creation of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps was partly meant to unite and organise the many different 
Khomeini-oriented militias and armed bands into one institution. As noted, the IRGC 
originated from some 6,000 fighters at its inception, and grew to number some 20,000 – 
30,000 in total manpower by 1980.158 This number then increased substantially to around 
50,000 in 1981 with the IRGC’s expanded responsibilities in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, 
meaning the Revolutionary Guard had markedly surpassed its leftist rivals in armed and 
available manpower.159
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Like Bani-Sadr and the more liberal political groups that had participated in the rise against 
the Shah’s regime, many of the forces on the left side of the political spectrum had accepted 
the prominence of Ayatollah Khomeini as a “uniting figure” of the Revolution with the belief 
that he would eventually retire from the political arena once the Revolution had triumphed. 
Many leftists, including the Tudeh party, therefore initially opted to support the IRP in 
undermining the more liberal forces, hoping to strengthen their own position within the 
Iranian state.160
 
 In the summer of 1981 however, the Mujahedin-e Khalq opted to support 
Bani-Sadr and call for a rebellion against the increasingly authoritarian regime of the 
fundamentalist ulama. The MEK organised demonstrations in support of Bani-Sadr, but these 
were brutally repressed by the IRGC and other pro-Khomeini revolutionary militias, and 
turned increasingly hostile and violent as demonstrators were killed in clashes, persecuted, 
arrested and executed.  
The MEK, with its long history of guerrilla warfare, was itself no stranger to violence, and in 
response to the suppression of its supporters it stepped up its attacks against the emerging 
Khomeinist regime. On 28 June 1981 a massive bomb at the IRP’s headquarters killed over 
70 people, including the IRP’s founder and general secretary Ayatollah Behesti, four cabinet 
members, six deputy ministers and twenty-seven parliament members. The MEK was widely 
believed to be responsible for the bomb-attack, and this episode served to further justify the 
fundamentalist ulama’s violent campaign of suppression against the Iranian left. Battles in the 
street, execution of MEK-guerrillas, closure of the leftist press and fierce persecution 
followed, and within a year the Khomeinist regime had executed around 6,000 of its 
opponents.161 The Mujahedin-e Khalq suffered a severe blow when the organisation’s main 
hideout in Tehran was discovered and many of its commanders were killed, prompting Masud 
Rajavi, the MEK’s top leader, to escape into exile along with Bani-Sadr to continue their 
resistance against the emerging post-revolutionary regime from abroad, although no longer 
representing any meaningful threat to the IRP and the Revolutionary Guard’s domination of 
the Iranian state.162
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After the Mujahedin-e Khalq had been thoroughly defeated, with many of its remaining 
members fleeing the country, the fundamentalist ulama turned their attention towards the 
remaining political leftist parties in the post-revolutionary Iranian power-struggle. The Tudeh 
party, the oldest and largest leftist party with the best-known leaders, had long backed the 
emerging revolutionary regime, and Khomeinists had used Tudeh support to help put down 
their other opponents and to facilitate relations with Moscow. Until 1983 the Tudeh was 
allowed to publish and spread its influence, but in early 1983 the IRP-dominated regime 
turned on the Tudeh, accusing the party of spying for the Soviet Union and plotting to 
overthrow the government.163 Over seventy prominent Tudeh members were arrested, while 
thirty-two Tudeh affiliated military officers were executed and hundreds of others purged 
from the armed forces.164
 
 A similar fate befell the Fedaiyen-e Khalq, which in any case was 
plagued by internal disagreements and had split into competing factions in the period 
following the Revolution, and both the Tudeh Party and the Fedaiyen-e Khalq were declared 
illegal in May 1983. Although MEK, Fedaiyen and Tudeh cells continued to harass the 
regime for some years to come, they posed no serious threat to the IRP-dominated 
government after 1983, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had played a pivotal role 
in ensuring the victory of Khomeini’s vision of the Islamic Republic. 
5.4 Internal security and policing functions 
In addition to securing the triumph of the fundamentalist ulama over their political 
competitors, the IRGC also performed a range of other internal duties within the post-
revolutionary state. One of the Revolutionary Guard’s tasks from its inception was the 
indoctrination of revolutionary values, a task directly linked to the IRGC’s role as the loyal 
vanguard of Islamic ideology and Ayatollah Khomeini’s teachings. The Office of the 
Representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC became a major channel for 
indoctrination, both within and outside the IRGC itself, especially propagating the doctrine of 
velayat-e faqih. During the Iran-Iraq War, this office oversaw the deployment of over 18,000 
clerics to bolster battlefield morale both among the regular Army soldiers and the 
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Revolutionary Guards, emphasising Shia ideology and the value of martyrdom.165 The IRGC 
also ensured popular adherence to Islamic law regulating social life by developing sub-units 
that policed the major cities looking for transgressors, like women not dressed strictly to 
Islamic conformity, youths playing Western music, or those eating during the daylight hours 
of the holy month of Ramadan. These units even entered homes to search for violations of 
Islamic custom, demonstrating the depth to which the IRGC penetrated post-revolutionary 
Iranian society.166
 
 
As showed in the previous chapter, the Iran-Iraq War prompted the IRGC to develop a clear 
command structure and a nationwide organisation that penetrated society down to the local 
levels. In addition to its engagement in the war effort, the Revolutionary Guard continued to 
exert its influence on the domestic scene through the liquidation and relentless persecution of 
the opponents of the revolutionary state, separatists, and other “morally corrupt” 
individuals.167 According to Bani-Sadr, attacking and arresting people in the streets and the 
use of torture against “enemies of the Revolution” were common practices of the IRGC, and 
Bani-Sadr further asserts that by 1984 “[t]he Guards had infiltrated all of the regime’s vital 
institutions”.168 In addition to defeating its main political rivals, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps also absorbed many of the other revolutionary organisations and early 
competitors like the hezbollah-groups and the local komitehs. The komitehs, often highly 
unpopular due to their excessive use of violence, were reigned in and gave up their 
administrative tasks when the Islamic government formed, and many komiteh guards were 
made to take tours to serve the IRGC at the battlefront and eventually became part of the 
Revolutionary Guard themselves. The remnants of the komitehs were finally voted to merge 
with the police and gendarmerie in 1990, and thus were dissolved while the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps persisted and expanded its organisational responsibilities.169
                                                 
165 Wehrey et al. (2009) p.36-7. 
 The 
IRGC developed to become the Islamic Republic’s principal organisation for intelligence and 
security in the course of the War, and although parts of its domestic intelligence role was 
ceded to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in 1983, the IRGC undoubtedly 
remained one of the most powerful internal institutions in Iran in light of its continued 
166 Katzman (1993) p.84. 
167 Wehrey et al. (2009) p.29-30. 
168 Bani-Sadr (1991) p.151, 191. Again it must be noted that Bani-Sadr’s statements should be regarded as truths 
with moderations, given his intensive political battle with the fundamentalist ulama and dislike of the IRGC. 
169 Katzman (1993) p.33, 42-3. 
57 
 
policing and security missions.170
 
 In sum, the IRGC increasingly came to monopolise the 
means of violence both externally, as showed in the previous chapter, and domestically within 
the post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure, a development that sets the Revolutionary 
Guard apart from other cases where somewhat similar armed forces were created in the wake 
of revolutionary struggles. 
Returning to Adelman’s earlier mentioned findings about the phases that military institutions 
usually go through in the course of a revolution, the first three steps seem to conform well to 
events as they took place in the course of the Iranian Revolution. The old Army was closely 
tied up with the Shah’s regime and was widely discredited, although allowed to persist, and 
the IRGC rose to prominence and proved its mettle by sweeping away internal challengers 
and holding its own against the Iraqi attackers. As showed, the Revolutionary Guard’s 
responsibilities however went far beyond those of an ordinary military organisation, and the 
IRGC’s role in providing internal order and security is what most clearly distinguishes it from 
other revolutionary armies, a comparison with the two major communist revolutions in the 
Soviet Union and China clearly demonstrating this point. In these countries domestic 
intelligence functions were not performed by the Red Army or the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA), but by the civilian KGB and the Ministry of State Security in the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China respectively. Moreover the IRGC proved a lot less hesitant to use 
force internally to disperse or arrest demonstrators than their more “professionalised” 
counterparts in these countries, and seemingly the Guard’s ideological commitment to uphold 
the principles of the Islamic Revolution was not dampened by its organisational development 
and specialisation.171
 
 
One major difference that might explain the IRGC’s extensive domestic role compared to the 
Soviet Army and the PLA is that the Revolutionary Guard was not subordinated to an 
organised ruling political party in the same way as the communist armed forces were 
controlled by the communist regimes. Even though the IRGC cooperated closely with the 
Islamic Republic Party in defeating internal enemies and securing the fundamentalist ulama’s 
vision of the Iranian Revolution, the IRP was increasingly torn by factional disputes and was 
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finally dissolved in 1987, another example of the IRGC outliving the other revolutionary 
organisations established in the early days after the fall of the Shah’s regime.172 The 
Revolutionary Guards considered themselves free from civilian political authority other than 
the Supreme Leader and kept control over advancements within their own ranks, and the 
IRGC itself constituted Iran’s most powerful security service.173 Unlike the PLA, the Red 
Army and also the French revolutionary army, the IRGC was not created in the same way by 
the civilian leadership or a political party, but developed from a pre-existing structure of 
underground guerrilla groups and militias that battled the Shah alongside, not subordinate to, 
the revolutionary clerics.174
 
 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps thus had independent 
roots in the Iranian Revolution before being united into a coherent institution following the 
decree from Ayatollah Khomeini, and although certainly fulfilling an important role as both 
the eyes, ears and spear tip of the emerging Khomeinist regime, the IRGC at the same time 
came to exert considerable political influence in its own right during the Iran-Iraq War. 
5.5 Political role and influence of the IRGC 
From its early beginnings, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was involved in the 
political struggle to control the outcome of the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution. The IRGC’s 
strong support of the ideology propagated by Khomeini and his associates naturally gave it a 
political outlook, but the Revolutionary Guard also increasingly wielded substantial political 
influence on its own merits. The IRGC’s engagement in politics however seems to be a direct 
contradiction of Ayatollah Khomeini’s order to all armed forces to stay clear of politicisation, 
Khomeini’s official chronicler Hamid Ansari quoting Khomeini as asserting: 
I insist that the armed forces obey the laws regarding the prevention of the military forces from entering 
into politics, and stay away from political parties, groups and [political] fronts. The armed forces 
[consisting of] the military, the police force, the guards, and the Basij should not enter into any 
[political] party or groups, and steer clear from political games.175
Guard Commander Mohsen Reza’i on the other hand defended the IRGC’s active political 
role, also by referring to purported statements by Ayatollah Khomeini: 
 
Once someone had asked Imam [Khomeini] as to why he lends so much support to the IRGC. The 
Imam had answered “why not?” and the interlocutor had warned him that it may result in staging a coup 
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[if the IRGC became too strong]. The Imam had answered, “It doesn’t matter; it stays in the family [if 
they stage a coup]; as they are our own guys.176
Revolutionary Guard Minister Mohsen RafiqDust further justified the politicisation of the 
IRGC on the grounds that the Revolutionary Guard was meant to defend the Revolution also 
from within, unlike the regular Army, and the IRGC’s mission to defend the purity of the 
Islamic Revolution, as codified in the Constitution, arguably is a political one as much as a 
military one.
 
177 The IRGC thus clearly differentiated itself from the more professional 
militaries, like the regular Iranian Army, which are to be depoliticised, solely focused on 
external defence, and remain loyal to whatever civilian regime is in power. Quite to the 
contrary the Revolutionary Guard did not consider itself confined to the military sector alone, 
and from its creation regarded it as its mission to play an active role also within other spheres 
of the post-revolutionary Iranian state.178
 
 Whether the IRGC should engage in politics or not 
still remains a contested debate, particularly in the post-Khomeini era, but it is however clear 
that the Revolutionary Guard’s increased power and institutional strength in the course of the 
Iran-Iraq War resulted in substantial political influence within the post-revolutionary Iranian 
state. 
As mentioned, the IRGC to a large degree resisted civilian authority and controlled 
advancements within its own ranks, and being a largely independent element in the coalition 
that brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power made the Revolutionary Guard a major political 
actor.179 The complicated state-structure created in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution 
with its multiple power-centres and checks and balances to prevent any one institution from 
getting too powerful (indeed the decision to retain the regular Iranian Army even after the 
War was largely driven by the desire to balance the power of the IRGC), resulted in a drift 
towards “behind the scenes” bargaining and informal decision-making that greatly favoured 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.180
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Shirazi as commander of the regular Army’s ground forces in March 1981, and later the 
promotion of Ali Shamkhani, one of the Guard’s most prominent figures after Reza’i, to 
become commander of the regular Navy in October 1989.181
 
 The IRGC’s considerable 
influence over rivalling organisations stands in clear contrast to other institutions inability to 
affect the internal composition and workings of the IRGC, testifying to the Revolutionary 
Guard’s extensive institutional strength and independence. 
In addition to constituting an inherently political project from its inception, many former and 
current Revolutionary Guards also rose to prominent positions within the post-revolutionary 
Iranian government. Early examples include Hasan Abedi-Jafari, a former member of the 
IRGC Supreme Council who served as Minister of Commerce until 1988, and Ali Mohammad 
Besharati, an anti-Shah guerrilla, former director of the Guard’s Intelligence Unit, and former 
member of the IRGC Supreme Council, who became Deputy Foreign Minister in 1984.182 
Narrowing down the concept of “political power” to simply imply the holding of important 
offices within the civilian state-structure, the IRGC therefore still constituted a political force 
to be reckoned with. This is however not to say that IRGC-personnel remained a united and 
coherent group as they reverted into politics, as factional disputes also existed within the 
Revolutionary Guard and some former members distanced themselves from earlier hard-line 
policies. Nevertheless service in the IRGC presented an increasingly regular venue for 
entering into civilian Iranian politics, and an important part of the IRGC’s political influence 
stemmed from the creation of networks formed at the front among the IRGC combatants 
during the War. These networks also included the IRGC’s counterparts in affiliated 
organisations, as I will return to in the next chapter.183
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presidency in 2005.184
 
 The roots of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ political 
prominence can thus be found in the extensive internal role and the large informal networks 
developed in the course of the Iran-Iraq War, contributing further to the rise of the IRGC to 
become one of the most powerful institutions within the post-revolutionary Iranian state. 
5.6 Summary: State-making and the evolving internal role of IRGC 
In the early period following the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps was mainly focused on ensuring the survival of the Revolution by providing 
order, security and preventing internal rebellions. From its creation the IRGC identified itself 
closely with the Islamic political ideology purveyed by the fundamentalist ulama close to 
Ayatollah Khomeini, and soon became heavily engaged in the activity of state-making, in the 
Tillyan sense of eliminating or neutralising internal rivals within the emerging Iranian state-
structure. This was clearly evidenced already in the first year following the victory of 
Revolution with the IRGC’s important role in undermining the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of Mehdi Bazargan. With the advent of the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC greatly 
expanded its organisation, responsibilities and capabilities, significantly increasing its 
domestic as well as external influence. The extensive rise in armed and available IRGC-
manpower tilted the internal Iranian power balance decisively in their favour, making the 
Revolutionary Guards and their allies in the IRP able to defeat their political rivals one by 
one, as the internal opposition failed to unite against the fundamentalist ulama but instead 
worked against each other in the hope of increasing their own political power. After the 
removal of Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr from the presidency in the summer of 1981, the IRGC and 
the IRP launched a vigorous campaign against the Mujahedin-e Khalq and other leftist parties, 
and by the end of 1983 all political competition was effectively removed from the struggle to 
dominate the post-revolutionary Iranian state. The IRGC continued to expand its internal 
security and policing functions, surpassing and absorbing many of the other revolutionary 
organisations created in the aftermath of the Revolution, and developed to become the Islamic 
Republic’s principal institution for intelligence and security in the course of the Iran-Iraq 
War. The Revolutionary Guard thus increasingly monopolised the means of violence within 
the Iranian state, and further compounded by its institutional independency and substantial 
networks created at the battlefront, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps came to be an 
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important and influential political actor in its own right, setting the precedent for later 
extensive involvement in politics. The government sector was however not the only civilian 
sphere infiltrated by the expanding IRGC-organisation, and next I turn my attention beyond 
the IRGC’s use of organised violence to shed light on the Revolutionary Guard’s social base 
and development into other fields of activity during the Iran-Iraq War. 
 
6 The “Mobilisation of the Oppressed”: Class-base, Privileges and the 
Expanding Roles of the IRPC 
As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps expanded its responsibilities in the wake of the 
Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC witnessed huge increases in manpower to perform its new duties. 
Many volunteers flocked to the IRGC driven by ideological conviction and a desire to defend 
the country and the Revolution, while others were more opportunistic, the IRGC offering a 
chance of upward social mobility and providing special perks and benefits for its members. 
Together with its closely affiliated sister-organisations the Revolutionary Guard played an 
important role in bringing the Iranian Revolution from the cities to the countryside, and the 
IRGC managed to draw substantial support from Iran’s rural areas. The needs of the War also 
prompted the Revolutionary Guard to develop its own weapons industry, having to rely on 
self-sufficiency in the face of the international arms embargo. The IRGC further penetrated 
the civilian spheres of the Islamic Republic by establishing its own schools, research facilities 
and engaging in the procurement and distribution of goods, to name but a few of the IRGC’s 
extensive activities. By the end of the War the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps constituted 
a small independent “business empire” in addition to its role as the principal organisation of 
state-controlled violence in Iran, adding to its overall position as one of the most powerful 
institutions within the post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure. 
 
6.1 Class-base of the IRGC: Recruitment, privileges and “protection” 
When the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was created in the direct aftermath of the 
Iranian Revolution it functioned to absorb many of Iran’s newly mobilised social forces, 
especially those elements motivated by the Islamic revolutionary ideology conveyed by the 
fundamentalist ulama under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. As mentioned, the bulk of 
the IRGC’s original members and organisers were urban anti-Shah guerrillas, like the 
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Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution, many of whom had experience from training with 
armed militias and resistance groups in other countries like the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) in Lebanon.185 This core group then took on new elements from private 
militias put together by revolutionary clerics from their mosque congregations, absorbing 
many smaller and local revolutionary organisations like the komitehs. The early 
Revolutionary Guards largely came from the same social baseline, being lower middle class 
urban, nonclerical militants that strongly supported the Islamic character of the Iranian 
Revolution.186
 
 
With the advent of the Iran-Iraq War, the Revolutionary Guard experienced a rapid expansion 
in manpower, and much of the IRGC’s rank and file were filled with zealous volunteers 
drawn from the urban poor. As the Revolution spread to the countryside, discussed in more 
detail in the next section, members also flocked to the IRGC from the rural areas, and the 
Basij-forces were largely created from highly ideologically and religiously motivated young 
and elderly volunteers from small towns and villages, many of whom were illiterates and in 
general less well-educated and politically sophisticated than the more cosmopolitan core of 
the Revolutionary Guards.187 Additional IRGC personnel were recruited from high school and 
university students, the government bureaucracy and factory workers. The IRGC also 
increasingly managed to incorporate non-ideological groups and rally them in support of the 
Khomeinist clerics, as somewhat more opportunistic but equally militant youths were drawn 
to the IRGC from urban slums and unemployment, regarding the IRGC as a tool for personal 
advancement providing possibilities for upward social mobility and offering better pay and 
benefits than the regular Army. The fact that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps played 
an important role in the distribution of goods made scarce by the War, controlling food 
rationing, price controls and petrol rationing among other things, also gave incentives to join 
the IRGC as the Revolutionary Guards often used their control over these resources to benefit 
themselves and the “true” supporters of the Revolution.188
                                                 
185 Katzman (1993) p.8-9. 
 In addition the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps was given exceptional power to call upon manpower from all 
sectors for the war effort as needed, and probably began to take conscripts by the mid 1980s 
as the War dragged on and the IRGC’s numbers were depleted in the costly “human wave” 
186 Katzman (1993) p.42-3. 
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operations, although conscription was not officially announced until 1987 along with harsh 
punishments for deserters.189
 
 Even parts of the population not originally committed to the 
IRGC’s Islamic ideology thus had a kind of “double” incentive to become part of the 
organisation; on the one hand membership could provide personal benefits and privileges, and 
on the other hand refusal to join could result in severe punishment. 
With the huge increases in IRGC manpower during the War, extended attention was given to 
the religious and civic indoctrination of all Revolutionary Guard units to ensure their 
adherence to the Islamic doctrines and principles propagated by Ayatollah Khomeini.190
 
 This 
was seen in the earlier mentioned heavily ideologically imbued instruction programs instituted 
for the basijis, the deployment of thousands of clerics to the front to boost battlefield morale, 
and also in the teachings emphasised at the IRGC’s own schools, as I will return to later. The 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps thus largely managed to retain revolutionary fervour 
within its ranks and remained dedicated to its mission of guarding the Revolution and its 
achievements. The lower middle class Islamic militants and the urban and rural poor became 
the main constituents of the IRGC, allied with the Khomeinist regime backed by the 
traditional forces represented by the bazaaris and the ulama. These social classes thus stood 
to gain the most from the Revolutionary Guard and the fundamentalist ulama’s rise in power 
to dominate the Islamic Republic and define the content of the Iranian Revolution.  
Turning to Tilly’s framework, it is clear that the IRGC engaged in the state-activity of 
protection, meaning “eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients”, on behalf of the 
above mentioned groups as the Revolutionary Guard and the Khomeinist regime defeated 
internal rivals and secured their grip over Iranian society.191
In the course of making war, extracting resources, and building up the state apparatus, the managers of 
states formed alliances with specific social classes. The members of those classes loaned resources, 
 Again it is worth quoting part of 
Tilly’s “idealized sequence” of how war influences state-building:  
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provided technical services, or helped ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, all in return 
for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies.192
This seems to describe well how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rose to prominence 
within the post-revolutionary Iranian state, relying on the support from the religiously zealous 
lower middle classes and the poor masses to ensure the compliance of the rest of society, and 
in return offering protection as well as special perks and benefits for its main constituents. 
The concept of protection also relates to the IRGC’s legitimacy as discussed earlier, in that 
the Revolutionary Guard’s ability to provide protection at the same time served to bolster the 
IRGC’s legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the above mentioned classes that made up the 
IRGC’s main supporters and gained the most from the Revolutionary Guard’s rise in power 
and influence. Ayatollah Khomeini many times returned to the theme that the “oppressed 
Iranian masses” were to be the primary beneficiaries of the Islamic Revolution, and with the 
revolutionary ideology spreading to the countryside, the Revolution truly became a mass 
mobilising event.
 
193
 
 
6.2 The IRGC and sister-organisations: Mass mobilisation and bringing the Revolution 
to the countryside 
As Skocpol concludes from her studies of social revolutions, one of the tasks at which 
revolutionary leaders seem to excel is the mobilisation of mass popular support, especially in 
the face of engaging in external warfare.194 In Iran the Revolution became a truly national 
event when the rebellion was brought to the countryside, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps played an important role in this process. Skocpol asserts that “the logic of state-
building through which social revolutions are successfully accomplished promotes both 
authoritarianism and popular mobilisation”, and in Iran this was exemplified as the 
Revolution brought an authoritarian clerical regime to power, but at the same time gave 
Iranians who never before had been involved in the national political life a chance to actively 
contribute to the formation of the new state-structure through enlisting in organisations like 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.195
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 This gave the Revolution popular appeal among 
the masses that had been subjugated and left out of politics all together under the Shah’s 
regime. Iran’s rural areas thus provided a huge potential number of volunteers for the 
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194 Skocpol (1988) p.149-50. 
195 Skocpol (1988) p.149, 165. 
66 
 
revolutionary organisations, and the fundamentalist ulama and the Revolutionary Guards were 
best situated to draw upon support from the countryside following the Iranian Revolution. As 
mentioned, the clergy could make use of their extensive religious networks to gain access to 
large crowds, also in Iran’s rural areas, and the IRGC developed its own substantial structure 
down to the local levels in the course of the War, with recruitment offices in towns and 
villages. However one additional factor also contributed greatly to the Revolutionary Guard’s 
penetration of the Iranian countryside; the IRGC’s close affiliation with other revolutionary 
organisations dedicated to spreading the ideology of the Khomeinist vision of the Iranian 
Revolution. 
 
The Jahad-e Sazandegi, meaning the “Construction Jihad” (or “Construction Crusade”), was 
created in the wake of the Revolution as the IRGC’s civilian counterpart, and was 
instrumental in gathering support for the Revolutionary Guard in the rural areas. The 
“Construction Jihad” engaged in development and specialised in construction efforts, and 
cooperated closely with the IRGC to implement government policies and to reorganise the 
Iranian countryside.196 Like the Revolutionary Guards and the basijis, the “Construction 
Jihad” drew its members from the same pool of committed believers and volunteers, and 
mobilised youths by sending them to rural areas to aid the poor with cheap or free housing, 
and also sanctioned some seizures of urban homes and rural lands by the poor.197 When the 
Iran-Iraq War broke out, the “Construction Jihad” in effect became the IRGC’s “Corps of 
Engineers”, setting up defensive emplacements, providing technological know-how, building 
roads and bridges for tactical operations and developing weapons industries, as I will return to 
in the next section. In the course of the War, the separation between the Jahad-e Sazandegi 
and the Revolutionary Guard became less and less visible, as the “Construction Jihad” more 
or less developed into a sub-organisation of the IRGC.198
 
 The Jahad-e Sazandegi served to 
significantly bolster the Revolutionary Guard’s popularity, especially in the countryside, and 
the IRGC also cooperated closely with other institutions to achieve this end. 
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Two other organisations closely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and 
the Khomeinist regime were the Bonyad-e Mostazafan, the “Foundation of the Oppressed”, 
and the Bonyad-e Shahidan, the “Martyr’s Foundation”. The Bonyad-e Mostazafan received 
the fortunes left by the former Shah’s Pahlavi Foundation and other properties confiscated in 
the course of the Revolution, including hundreds of companies, factories, housing units, 
agricultural lands and substantial holdings in the West. These massive assets were then used 
to reward the loyal supporters of the fundamentalist ulama and the Revolutionary Guards.199 
With the advent of the Iran-Iraq War, the Bonyad-e Shahidan was created and given large 
funds dedicated to the war effort, especially to take care of the families of War martyrs and 
wounded personnel from the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij. The families of martyrs 
received a grant of 2 million rials (roughly $ 30,000 at the time), while those crippled and 
long-service volunteers were given priority in acquiring scarce goods, jobs and housing, all 
intended to ensure continued commitment to the emerging Khomeinist regime and the war 
effort in face of the high Iranian casualty-rates.200
 
 These organisations, together with the 
“Construction Jihad”, thus functioned to shield the IRGC’s main constituencies from the 
worst impacts of the War, and were very important for the Revolutionary Guard and its allies 
in the IRP to retain mass popular support within the Iranian population. 
With the help of the IRGC’s affiliated organisations, Iran’s rural areas became a substantial 
powerbase for the Revolutionary Guard and the Khomeinist regime. Bani-Sadr comments on 
how the Khomeinists undermined his authority as president by taking control over the 
countryside, asserting that “[i]n each city, the mullahs exercised unlimited economic power. 
They sent the Guards to seize factories, land, machinery, goods”.201
[P]ublic perceptions of the IRGC appear split between urban areas, where it is seen as the regime’s 
shock-troop force for quelling dissent and enforcing strict social mores, and rural areas, where its 
 Securing the support of 
Iran’s rural population was thus an important step in the IRGC and fundamentalist ulama’s 
rise to dominate the Iranian state-structure, and according to Wehrey et al. the Revolutionary 
Guards still seem to have a large following in the Iranian countryside, asserting in 2009 that: 
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construction projects and promises of upward mobility through training have induced a more favorable 
view among certain marginalized population segments.202
The IRGC’s affiliated organisations also made up an important part of the extensive 
revolutionary social networks created in the course of the Iran-Iraq War, as discussed earlier, 
which former and current Revolutionary Guard members could draw upon to exert 
considerable influence over Iranian society, also within the political sphere. The close 
relationship between the IRGC and the above mentioned institutions were cemented by the 
large degree to which Guard members rotated in and out of or served simultaneously in these 
organisations, one example being Ali Reza Afshar, an early leader of the “Construction Jihad” 
who was also a member of the Revolutionary Guard and later became the Guard’s official 
spokesman and Chief of Staff to Commander Reza’i, and also witnessed by Revolutionary 
Guard Minister Mohsen RafiqDust becoming head of the Bonyad-e Mostazafan after the 
War’s end in 1988.
 
203
 
 In addition the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ close association 
with these affiliated organisations represents an early example of the IRGC’s infiltration into 
other areas of state activity beyond strictly being an institution for organised violence, a 
development that was to be carried a lot further in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. 
6.3 Self-sufficiency: Arms-embargo and the evolving Iranian arms industry 
With the Iran-Iraq War dragging on and Iran being subject to an international arms embargo, 
the Iranian armed forces soon found the substantial war materials left behind in the Shah’s 
arsenals depleted. Prevented from importing spare parts, weapons and ammunition, Iran had 
to resort to what Revolutionary Guard Commander Mohsen Reza’i referred to as “innovation 
and creativity” to sustain the war effort, culminating in the creation of a substantial 
indigenous arms industry aimed at providing self-sufficiency for the Iranian armed forces.204
To a greater degree than perhaps any Guard subunit, its weapons research and production apparatus 
demonstrate the Guard’s ability to combine highly educated technocrats and experts and scientific 
 
The developing Iranian arms industry was controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps through the IRGC Ministry from the Ministry’s inception in 1982, and Katzman asserts 
that: 
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techniques with virtually illiterate, religiously and ideologically motivated warriors under the same 
organizational umbrella.205
In its weapons research program the Revolutionary Guard cooperated closely with the more 
technically capable “Construction Jihad”, but also with the regular Iranian Army and 
personnel characterised as “industrialists and technocrats” by Guard Minister Mohsen 
RafiqDust.
 
206
 
 Nevertheless the IRGC made sure that it itself remained the main benefactor of 
the arms industry, and more often than not kept most of its production for use by its own 
Revolutionary Guard forces. 
In 1983 a Deputy Minister for Industries was established within the IRGC Ministry, 
responsible for the work of 13 industrial groups charged with research related to arms 
production. This work included retro-fitting, reconditioning and repair of existing equipment, 
production of munitions, shells and light arms, work on anti-tank missiles, air defence (SAM) 
and surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), and research for future production of submarines, 
aircrafts and drones.207 By 1986-87 the Revolutionary Guard’s domestic military production 
facilities were directing 37 secret weapons development projects, concentrating on light 
propeller air craft for the IRGC Air Force and missile manufacturing capabilities with some 
Chinese and North Korean help. The Revolutionary Guard, together with the “Construction 
Jihad”, is said to have produced, among other things, their own amphibious armoured 
personnel carriers, submarines, tugboats, tanks, hovercrafts and helicopters.208 By 1987 IRGC 
Minister RafiqDust claimed that Iran could produce 70-80 percent of its own ammunition, and 
Revolutionary Guard Commander Reza’i claimed self-sufficiency in bullets and mortar-
shells, production of RPG-7s and other anti-tank missiles underway, and also that Iran would 
soon manufacture its own SAMs and SSMs. The Iranian Defence Minister further reported 
that Iran could produce 47 types of ammunition, as compared to only 7 types in 1979, and by 
the end of the War Iran claimed to have 240 weapons factories up and running.209
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 Reports 
also suggest that the Iranian nuclear research program, subject to a heated international debate 
in later times, originated during the Iran-Iraq War. The program might have been started as 
early as 1986, when the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdolqazem Khan visited central Iranian 
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construction facilities, but first became evident in 1987 when an Iranian nuclear research 
centre was established by the IRGC in west Tehran.210
 
 In sum, although some of the IRGC’s 
claims about its own achievements and capabilities were clearly overstated, the Iranian arms 
industry did develop significantly in the course of the Iran-Iraq War and played a very 
important part in the overall Iranian war effort, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
was, and still continues to be, heavily involved in all of Iran’s major weapons research 
programs. 
The burgeoning Iranian arms industry served multiple purposes for the emerging post-
revolutionary regime. First of all it reduced Iran’s dependency on foreign arms, ammunition 
and war material, reducing the effect of the international arms embargo and allowing Iran to 
sustain its war effort. The weapons research programs also served to affirm the regime’s 
belief in self-reliance, seemingly proving that Iran could hold its own as an independent 
nation by relying on its own resources, and not least the domestic arms industry functioned as 
a cheaper substitute for expensive imports provided by “sanction busters” and the unstable 
military black market.211 With the expansion of the indigenous arms industry the IRGC 
Ministry was also able to centralise the allocation and acquisition of weapons, as in the first 
few years of the War each Guard had been responsible for providing his own weaponry, 
usually required by looting the Shah’s armouries or captured in battle from the Iraqi armed 
forces. The central allocation of arms was an important factor for the IRGC’s development 
into a national rather than a private or local force, as Katzman, quoting Max Weber, asserts 
that the transition from private to national control over the legitimate use of force in a society 
is a major indicator of nation-building.212
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 The centralisation of the armed forces was thus at 
the same time an indicator of the consolidation of the Khomeinist revolutionary regime, 
contributing to the regime’s legitimacy as the supreme wielder of force. The IRGC’s 
expansion into weapons production also served to increase its power by putting it in charge of 
the distribution of available arms, and as the Iranian weapons industry developed, the 
Revolutionary Guard acquired extensive new capabilities within the fields of manufacturing, 
construction, technology and research. These new organisational capacities could later be put 
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to use also within the regular Iranian civilian economy, adding to the overall influence of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps within the post-revolutionary state. 
 
6.4 Providing education and procurement of goods 
The Revolutionary Guard also expanded its reach into other civilian activities in the course of 
the Iran-Iraq War, including the educational sector. The Revolutionary Guard had early on 
developed purely military training programs for its member, but in 1982 this was taken a step 
further when the IRGC inaugurated its own “high school”, the Imam Sadegh School, which 
combined general education with military training and Islamic ideology. Students spent parts 
of the provided two and a half year program in IRGC military camps to prepare for 
participation in the War, and by the end of 1984 the IRGC had established branches of its 
high school in all of its administrative districts throughout Iran.213 The Revolutionary Guard 
further expanded its educational capabilities by moving into higher education in 1986, with 
the opening of the Imam Hossein University. The University had an early capacity of some 
800 students and graduated its first class in 1988, offering advanced studies in military 
sciences, engineering, management and medical science.214
 
 The IRGC’s educational 
programs was thus clearly aimed at providing the necessary competence and expertise needed 
for the war effort, and like the more specialised military instruction programs instituted for the 
Revolutionary Guard’s armed services, they were heavily imbued with Islamic ideology. 
With the IRGC’s development into a substantial organisation in the course of the Iran-Iraq 
War, the Revolutionary Guard also came to be an important actor in the procurement and 
distribution of goods and resources. As mentioned, the IRGC was responsible for distributing 
many goods made scarce by the War, and frequently made use of these to the advantage of its 
own members and supporters. The IRGC also came to control many airfields, ports and 
border patrol stations in light of its expanded military responsibilities, which represented the 
Revolutionary Guard with an opportunity to export and import merchandise without 
government supervision. The IRGC increasingly used these entry points to deal in goods 
outside of the regular Iranian market, securing luxury goods for its own members and 
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distributing popular sought after merchandise at high prices.215
 
 It is not clear when the 
Revolutionary Guard started engaging in black-market profiteering, nor is the full extent of 
this underground shadow economy known, but it is safe to assume that these activities derived 
from the IRGC’s extensive control over scarce goods, rationing, price controls and border 
entry points during the Iran-Iraq War. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ active role in 
the procurement and handling of goods thus set the precursor for later substantial involvement 
within the Iranian economy, both legal and black-market, and together with the IRGC’s 
educational role represented a further penetration of the civilian spheres of the Iranian state. 
6.5 Summary: The expanding roles of the IRGC and the end of the War 
The question then remains as to what can account for the development of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps from being a military organisation to engage in civilian activities 
like industry, education and the economy. Once more, the War seems to be the determining 
influence explaining the expansion of the IRGC into these sectors of the Iranian state. The 
needs of the Iran-Iraq War was certainly what prompted the IRGC to engage in weapons 
manufacturing and research, being unable to rely on supplies from the international market 
due to the Western-led arms embargo. Likewise, the desire to prepare young people for 
service in the War is what drove the Revolutionary Guard to institute training programs, 
schools and the Imam Hossein University. The IRGC’s penetration of the economic sphere 
followed from its important role in the distribution of goods made scarce by the War and its 
close relationship with affiliated organisations controlling substantial funds and competence, 
all of which were used to benefit the Revolutionary Guard’s supporters and channelled into 
the war effort. The IRGC’s control of ports, air fields and other entry points into the country 
was also a by-product of the War, which gave the Revolutionary Guards the opportunity to 
engage in black-market profiteering. In sum therefore, all of these activities can be argued to 
originate with the advent of the Iran-Iraq War, lending support to Tilly’s theory of war as a 
major factor conditioning state-building. As mentioned earlier, the IRGC’s task of “guarding 
the Revolution and its achievements”, as defined in the 1979 Iranian Constitution, offered few 
restrains as to limiting the IRGC’s penetration of society, and could be used to justify the 
Revolutionary Guard’s intervention into all of these sectors within the Islamic Republic.216
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As the War drew to a close it was clear that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its 
main constituents in the “oppressed” classes were among the groups that had gained the most 
from the transformation of Iranian society brought about by the war effort. Reversing the 
effects of the War by limiting the size or scope of duties of the IRGC in a time of peace thus 
presented a difficult political and social problem for the Islamic Republic, and Chubin & 
Tripp, writing in the last year of the War before the end of hostilities, comment upon this 
issue: 
Growing from some 30,000 in 1980, by 1986 they [the Revolutionary Guards] had become a force of 
over 200,000 with internal and external security missions, with their own Commander, Minister, and 
Ministry, with plans to expand into specialized areas such as special forces, as well as into an air and 
naval arm. Expanded numerically and in mission, virtually an independent empire, (the Guards’ budget 
in part is not accountable to the Maljes), and with their special perks and benefits, the Guards Corps 
have become a formidable interest group. They would certainly resist the withdrawal of their privileges 
or their contraction to their previous internal security mission.217
Later events were to prove Chubin & Tripp correct in this assessment, with the Revolutionary 
Guard retaining its position and influence within the Iranian state-structure even after the end 
of the War. Furthermore, as shown in the introduction, today the IRGC is arguably more 
powerful than ever within the Islamic Republic of Iran. The roots of the Revolutionary 
Guard’s dominant position in Iranian society can clearly be traced to developments that took 
place in the course of the decade between 1978 and 1988, testifying to the considerable 
influence exerted on the post-revolutionary Iranian state-building process by the Iran-Iraq 
War, and supporting the overall conclusion that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was 
born by Revolution, and raised by War. 
 
 
7 Conclusion: Born by Revolution, Raised by War 
Created by decree from Ayatollah Khomeini on 5 May 1979 in the chaotic aftermath of the 
1978-79 Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps grew to become one of 
the most powerful institutions within the Iranian state in the course of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
War. Given the inherit collapse of existing governmental structures and organisations implied 
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by the Revolution, the following War exerted a considerable influence on the emerging post-
revolutionary Iranian state-structure. This development conforms well to Charles Tilly’s 
framework of “war-making and state-making”, where war is seen as the catalyst driving and 
conditioning the state-building process through the four state-activities of war-making, state-
making, protection and extraction. Tilly’s theory however meets with a mixed track record 
when it comes to explaining state-building in a non-European context, and differs from the 
Iranian experience in some important respects. First of all, the Iranian state-building I have 
been concerned with in this paper does not conform strictly to Tilly’s “idealized sequence” 
which takes place over centuries of time and with the absence of any state-like entity as its 
starting-point, but rather happened within a relatively short period of time following a 
revolution that swept away a distrusted established regime and many of its institutions. 
Furthermore, the end result of Tilly’s “idealized sequence”, strong, durable institutions within 
a coherent state-structure, arguably only partially fits the reality of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, which is still largely ridden by factionalism and internal dissent. Nevertheless, noting 
that the Islamic Republic remains young compared to its European counterparts, Tilly’s 
theoretical framework does provide valuable insights into how wars influence the course of 
state-building. Understanding Tilly’s framework of “war-making and state-making” as a 
continuing process influencing not only the emergence, but also the further development of 
state-structures, therefore makes it a valuable tool to help study the effects of the Iran-Iraq 
War on the post-revolutionary Iranian state-building experience. The Revolutionary Guard’s 
substantial engagement in all of Tilly’s state-activities helps explain the rise of the IRGC to 
such a dominant position in Iranian society, becoming the Islamic Republic’s most powerful 
armed force both externally and domestically. The IRGC also developed beyond solely being 
an organisation of organised violence to become an important actor within the civilian spheres 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the many important roles and responsibilities taken on by 
the Revolutionary Guard in the course of the Iran-Iraq War set the precursors for the IRGC’s 
future extensive penetration of the Iranian state. 
 
To fully understand the rise of the Revolutionary Guard it is essential to take the effects of the 
Iranian Revolution into consideration. It was the Iranian Revolution that swept away the 
established regime of Mohammed Reza Shah and thus brought with it the requirements of 
renewed state-building efforts in Iran. The many Iranian social forces that had united to 
overthrow the authoritarian regime of Mohammed Reza Shah were however driven by a large 
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array of different ideologies, and as soon as the Revolution had triumphed the coalition gave 
way to internal disagreements between different political factions over the future direction of 
the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. From its inception the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps was therefore but one of many armed revolutionary organisations that vied for 
influence over the post-revolutionary Iranian society, facing challenges to its authority from 
both the right and left side of the political spectrum as well as from the local komitehs and the 
revolutionary tribunals. With the Islamic Republic still engulfed in revolutionary turmoil, 
Saddam Hussein perceived an opportunity to readdress old grievances against Iran, and in the 
wake of the Iran-Iraq War the lack of organisations deemed suitable and trustworthy for 
performing essential war-related functions resulted in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
greatly expanding its role and responsibilities within the emerging Iranian state. 
 
Engaging in war-making, understood as one of Tilly’s four state-activities, prompted the 
IRGC to develop from a relatively small and domestically focused revolutionary militia into a 
full-fledged, well-organised military force rivalling the regular Iranian Army. With the Iraqi 
invasion in September 1980, mass popular support and revolutionary fervour was channelled 
into the IRGC as the emerging Khomeinist regime advocated the rise of the Revolutionary 
Guards to take the lead in the Iranian war effort. To take on its new responsibilities the IRGC 
expanded its organisation to encompass formal recruitment and training programs, its own 
Ministry, control of the Basij volunteer forces, and a clear command structure penetrating 
Iranian society down to the local levels. The IRGC developed along the lines of a 
conventional military force, with divisions, corps and brigades, and moved into fields 
previously dominated by the Artesh by establishing its own mechanised forces, artillery units, 
Air Force and Navy. As volunteers flocked to the battlefront, the Revolutionary Guard 
swelled in numbers, doubling from some 20,000 – 30,000 in 1980 to around 50,000 during 
the first year of warfare. By 1987 the total forces of the IRGC numbered close to 450,000 
men, outgrowing the regular Iranian Army and making the IRGC Iran’s most powerful 
external force. The effects of the War on the institutional development of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps at the same time had major repercussions for its increasingly 
important internal role within the Islamic Republic. 
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From its creation the IRGC identified itself closely with the Islamic political ideology 
conveyed by the fundamentalist ulama close to Ayatollah Khomeini, and soon became 
heavily engaged in the activity of state-making, in the Tillyan sense of eliminating or 
neutralising internal rivals within the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. This was 
witnessed already in 1979 with the IRGC’s important role in undermining the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of Mehdi Bazargan, and with the advent of the Iran-Iraq War, the 
IRGC greatly expanded its organisation, responsibilities and capabilities. The extensive rise in 
armed and available IRGC-manpower altered the internal Iranian power balance decisively, 
the Revolutionary Guards joining forces with the Khomeinist Islamic Republic Party and 
finding the War a convenient pretext to suppress their political rivals. After the removal of 
Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr from the presidency in the summer of 1981, the IRGC and the IRP 
launched a vigorous campaign against the Mujahedin-e Khalq and other leftist parties, and by 
the end of 1983 all political competition was effectively removed from the struggle to 
dominate the post-revolutionary Iranian state. The IRGC continued to expand its internal 
security and policing functions, surpassing and absorbing many of the other revolutionary 
organisations created in the aftermath of the Revolution, and developed to become the Islamic 
Republic’s principal institution for both external and domestic intelligence and security in the 
course of the Iran-Iraq War. The needs of the War also prompted the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps to extend its reach into the civilian spheres of the Islamic Republic, further 
adding to the IRGC’s overall influence over Iranian society. 
 
With the IRGC’s expanded responsibilities in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, the 
Revolutionary Guard also engaged in the protection of its main supporters to increase and 
sustain its manpower and ensure the compliance of the rest of the population. The IRGC’s 
core of lower middle class militants was joined by substantial numbers drawn from the urban 
and rural poor to fill the Revolutionary Guard’s rank and file. These “oppressed classes” 
became the main constituents of the IRGC, made up of zealous volunteers motivated by 
religious and ideological fervour, and somewhat more opportunistic cadres regarding the 
IRGC as a tool for personal advancement, providing possibilities for upward social mobility 
and offering better pay and benefits than the regular Army. The IRGC’s penetration of the 
economic sphere followed from its important role in the distribution of goods made scarce by 
the War and its close relationship with affiliated organisations controlling substantial funds 
and competence, all of which were used to benefit the Revolutionary Guard’s supporters and 
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channelled into the war effort. The needs of the Iran-Iraq War also prompted the IRGC to 
engage in weapons manufacturing and research, being unable to rely on foreign supplies due 
to the international arms embargo, and preparing the population for service in the War drove 
the Revolutionary Guard to institute formal educational and training programs. The Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps’ role as defined in the 1979 Iranian Constitution, charged with 
“guarding the Revolution and its achievements”, offered few restrains as to limiting the 
IRGC’s penetration of society, and could be used to justify the Revolutionary Guard’s 
expansion to wield substantial influence over various sectors within the Islamic Republic in 
the course of the War. 
 
Far from being forgotten, the important events of the decade between 1978 and 1988 continue 
to exert a considerable impact on the shape and modern outlook of the Iranian state. Many of 
the developments that took place in the course of War can also to some extent be seen as 
precursors to the IRGC’s dominating position in Iran today. Although the IRGC’s 
performance on the battlefield was mixed at best, it continues to try to cultivate a large 
amount of legitimacy from the crucial role it played in the “sacred defence” of the Islamic 
Republic. The Revolutionary Guard’s influence within domestic Iranian politics was 
experienced already during the War-years with former and current Guards holding important 
government offices, which can be seen as setting the precedent for later extensive political 
involvement, witnessed not least with the former Revolutionary Guard Mahmud Ahmedinejad 
ascending to the presidency in 2005. The IRGC’s control of scarce goods, ports, air fields and 
other entry points into the country was also a by-product of the War, which gave the 
Revolutionary Guards the opportunity to engage in widespread black-market profiteering. In 
addition, through the burgeoning Iranian weapons industry the Revolutionary Guard acquired 
extensive new capabilities within the fields of manufacturing, construction, technology and 
research that later could be put to use within the civilian Iranian economy. 
 
Given all the above mentioned developments, there can be little doubt as to the extensive 
impact exerted on the Iranian state-building process by the Iran-Iraq War, one of the most 
important consequences being the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to become 
one of the most powerful institutions within the Iranian state-structure. With the IRGC 
constituting such a powerful organisation at the end of the War, it was well positioned to 
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resist any substantial infringements made on its privileges, influence and revolutionary 
mission, and the Revolutionary Guard has managed to retain its position as one of the most 
important institutions within the post-revolutionary Iranian state-structure. Although later 
events since the War’s end certainly also shaped and conditioned the IRGC’s further 
development, it is clear that the prominent position of the Revolutionary Guard in Iranian 
society today cannot be fully understood without reference to the important roles taken on by 
the IRGC in the course of the all-important Iran-Iraq War. Born as a revolutionary militia 
among many in the turmoil of the Iranian Revolution, the War remains the major explanatory 
factor that raised the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to become one of the most powerful 
and influential institutions within the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
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